Class 248.7 Book W34
General Theological Seminary Library
CHELSEA SQUARE, NEW YORK

Purchased from the fund bequeathed to the Seminary by
EUGENE AUGUSTUS HOFFMAN, D. D.
DEAN 1879-1902

The Intuition of God

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mysticism

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/bwb_T5-DGU-046

The Intuition of God

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mysticism

The Hastie Memorial Lectures delivered at Glasgow University, 1927

BY

T. M. WATT

M.A. (ABERD.), M.A. (OXON.)

SOMETIME FELLOW AND LECTURER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, MANSFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD

GEN. THEO. SEMINARY
LIBRARY
NEW YORK

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS LTD.
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
1929

Printed in Great Britain *All Rights reserved*

248.7
W34
87434

COLGATE ROCHESTER
DIVINITY SCHOOL
LIBRARY
NEW YORK

TO

MY WIFE

PREFACE.

THE aim of the Hastie Lectureship is "to encourage the study of Theology among the ministers of the Church of Scotland." As a fruit of this encouragement, these Lectures are now published, substantially as they were delivered in October and November 1927. Sections of the Lectures, which had to be omitted owing to lack of time, appear in their proper place.

Mysticism has been discussed in recent years from many points of view. To the comprehensive treatises on this subject published in recent years I am greatly indebted. But my aim in these Lectures is a limited one. Without attempting to survey the whole field, I have sought to present an intensive study of the nature of the soul's fundamental apprehension of God—the Intuition of God. It is from this point of view that I employ the sub-title, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mysticism."

My problem compelled me to face the criticism of religious experience from the standpoint of a Psychology of Religion, which by its radical and

erroneous methods would divorce religion from Reality. The attack on religion from this quarter can best be met, I believe, by seeking to lay bare the underlying metaphysical assumptions in such attempts. Psychology as a pure science has its own justification and method, but when there is latent in its procedure an anti-religious metaphysic, an endeavour must be made to bring this metaphysic to light, and to show its effect on the psychology. The prime thesis of these Lectures is just that religious experience is not merely a state of consciousness moving ever within the limits of the 'subjective,' but likewise an apprehension of Reality, an Intuition of God. I have dealt at some length with the pseudo-psychological attack on religious experience.

To show, further, what service Psychology may render to Religion, I have given some attention to the work of Professor Rudolph Otto. Finally, I have sketched in outline the value which the study of Mysticism has for Theology.

Two of those who gave me encouragement and help in my work have died since I was elected to the Lectureship—*i.e.*, Professor H. M. B. Reid and my brother, Dr Henry J. Watt, both of Glasgow University. I had hoped to profit much from my brother's advice, but he died before the Lectures had taken definite form in my mind. I have used an early review of his in discussing Leuba's 'Psychology of Religion,' but have done so, I believe, so far as and no further than he would have still adhered to these

opinions. He heartily welcomed my endeavour to treat of Mysticism as the subject of my Lectures. I am likewise indebted to other friends in various ways, especially for procuring books for me and in help with the proofs. I gratefully acknowledge such help from the Rev. A. T. Cadoux, D.D.; the Rev. Sydney Smith, B.D.; the Rev. Herbert Gamble, M.A.; and Mr Basil Mathews. During the delivery of the Lectures, Professor W. B. Stevenson, D.Litt., and Professor A. B. Macaulay, D.D., showed every kindness to a stranger visiting the University and city of Glasgow, to both of which, for many reasons, he owes much.

To a Glasgow friend, who has shown continued interest in my work, I cannot but repeat my cordial thanks.

T. M. WATT.

Chapel of the Maccabees,
Geneva,
March 29th, 1929.

CONTENTS.

		PAGE
LECTURE I.	INTUITION AND REASON . . .	1
LECTURE II.	PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE	29
LECTURE III.	THE QUESTION OF THE NON-RATIONAL IN RELIGION	73
LECTURE IV.	CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM AND THEOLOGY	101
INDEX		133

LECTURE I.

INTUITION AND REASON

INTUITION AND REASON.

I INTEND to approach the problem by a consideration of the part played by the various phases and kinds of cognitive experience in our mental life.

To-day in all things we are prone to follow the way of experience; and certainly that is true of writers on religion. They are all busily engaged in the analysis and interpretation of religious experience. The old Rational Theology with its arguments for the Existence of God tends to be distrusted and set aside, though probably this tendency has now gone to an extreme, so that the pendulum will swing back again in favour of these historic arguments. After all the Ontological argument is in its essence, though not always in its apparent form, the basal argument of all great idealistic or spiritualistic views of the Universe; the Teleological argument, if I mistake not, will yet find a full and adequate restatement in terms of Science, working along the lines of the Theory of Evolution; while the Cosmological argument

underlies the plain man's thinking about the world, and, despite the destructive logic which lays its axe at the roots of many of the forms of this argument, it may yet reassert itself in healthy growth and vigour, with sap and life in its veins. But, meantime, that "thorough-going empiricist, the Mystic" (as Royce calls him), makes a claim for his evidence to be considered, as bearing witness to the immediate Presence of God in the soul. That will be the first task that faces us in this lecture.

The student of Theology, since he deals with the ultimate objects of human knowledge and insight, cannot be content to neglect any factors in Experience which will increase that insight and knowledge. The part played by reason is here, of course, of prime importance. Without it neither science, philosophy, nor theology is possible. It is the mind's instrument of coherent thinking, whether or not the rational alone constitutes the real—as is maintained by the great speculative or Absolute-idealistic systems of Philosophy.

It will appear that I have made at least one grand assumption in this statement about the character of Theology—*i.e.*, that it is the science of religious experience so far as that experience apprehends "ultimate reality," or in the phrase of F. W. Robertson, "the secret and mystery of existence." But at present I shall content myself by stating—

1. That to my mind the mediæval definition of Theology as " Scientia Scientiarum " is still the complete ideal of Theological enquiry; and
2. That religious experience, as forming the groundwork of Theology, or Philosophy of Religion, claims to be in touch with, and to apprehend, God as the ultimate Real Being, the Life of the World.

The question doubtless arises, as the result of these affirmations, as to what degree of Truth, and what measure of illusion this type of experience—the religious—exhibits; but at present, though realising the gravity of the question, I must defer giving an answer till a later part of the discussion. It is perhaps sufficient to say that religious experience stakes its claim to interpret the nature of God upon its assurance that its knowledge of God is real and trustworthy.[1] Religious experience is far from being homogeneous in form and content in its manifold varieties; but by the aid of the idea of development, as well as by a critical discussion of these varieties from the point of view of Psychology and Philosophy, much may be done to eliminate the false phases, and to throw into relief the true and

[1] F. H. Bradley, ' Appearance and Reality,' p. 449: " There is nothing more real than what comes in religion. To compare facts such as these with what comes to us in outward existence would be to trifle with the subject. The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks."

trustworthy. "Our experience," writes Professor Pringle-Pattison, "is nowhere infected by radical falsehood." [1]

While, then, recognising the importance of Reason in the life of Religion as well as in the Conceptions of Theology, we must yet take account of supplementary factors in our apprehension of religious Truth. They appear as soon as one attempts to analyse the experiences of the religious life. According to F. H. Bradley the Absolute cannot be known by the abstract categories of a "relational" kind, for these relations inevitably result in self-contradiction. And since for him "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself," [2] knowledge which is inconsistent and self-contradictory is, in Bradley's phrase, "mere appearance." The presence of self-contradiction in our thinking reveals that we are dealing with appearance, and not with Reality. But one suggestion which Bradley makes in the course of his discussion is, from the present point of view, well worthy of notice. He puts it thus: "We can form the general idea of an absolute 'intuition' in which phenomenal distinctions are merged: a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness." [3] Or again: "Thought can form the idea of an apprehension, something like feeling in directness, which contains all the character sought by its (*i.e.*, thought's) relational efforts."

[1] 'Idea of God,' p. 28. [2] 'Appearance and Reality,' p. 36.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

Now it is likely that if we can "form the general idea of an absolute intuition, something like 'feeling' in its directness," some experience corresponding to that intuition may be present within the range of our conscious life. At any rate it is described as "something like feeling in its directness," and it matters little at present whether this feeling be considered in its first raw immediacy of apprehension, or as transmuted by the work and labour of thought into a rich and full or higher immediacy of feeling, or in Spinoza's phrase in describing the third kind of knowledge, "Scientia Intuitiva." Such a doctrine as that of Bradley's in this matter is a remarkable assertion of the importance of the non-rational elements of consciousness as affording insight to ultimate Truth. It is a departure from the traditional Hegelian teaching in this respect, and reasserts rather the doctrine of Spinoza as regards "Scientia Intuitiva," akin surely to the informed "flash of insight" of a great scientist when he finds that all the facts under his purview fall into coherence when viewed in the light of some illuminating hypothesis. It is, at any rate, a type of insight which is intuitive and non-relational—"something like 'feeling' in its directness," in Bradley's phrase. "We delight in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, and our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause." [1] Both thinkers, though their psychology differs in many respects, converge in their assertion

[1] Spinoza, 'Ethics,' v. Prop. xxxii.

of the worth of certain phases of experience, other than ratiocinative thought, for the apprehension of the Absolute. Bradley speaks of feeling, Spinoza of "Scientia Intuitiva"; but in both cases consciousness asserts itself as claiming an apprehension or knowledge of Divine Reality, as unitary and intuitive, rather than ratiocinative and discursive: as genuine insight not otherwise obtainable, "a total experience where will and thought and feeling may all once more be one." [1]

In this respect Bradley broke away from the traditional teaching of the Neo-Hegelian school in England and Scotland. But it is not too much to say that it was symptomatic of a new attitude towards religious experience, which was then making itself felt in Theology, as well as in Philosophy. The main factors which have contributed to this change are (1) the prolonged study of the phenomena of the religious life by students of Psychology and, more especially, of Mysticism, whereby the mental data, which are involved in religious experience, have been brought to light; and (2) the return from Theology to Religion and its basis in experience, which has been evident for the past two generations.

There is ample evidence for the first of these movements. The Bampton Lectures on 'Christian Mysticism,' by the present Dean of St Paul's, were delivered in the year 1899; and in the years 1901-1902 William James gave in Edinburgh his Gifford

[1] Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

Lectures on the ' Varieties of Religious Experience.' Both these volumes are well known to students, and remain as landmarks in the history of the study of the " Life of God in the Soul of Man." Since then many equally well-known works on these subjects, written from differing standpoints, have appeared, showing the widespread and continued interest in this transcendent subject.

The other movement has not brought about the downfall of Theology. Theology is still the most vital of all the great topics of human enquiry. But in the phrase " The return from Theology to Religion " we have indicated the nature of the new approach to Theology characteristic of this period. Theology is understood as being a product of religious experience, the intellectual expression of that Experience—all its factors and influences—in terms of Reason. It is not to be denied that Theology draws upon many aspects of human experience in order to complete its systematic structure. It cannot, for instance, stand aloof from the great concepts which have emerged during the history of philosophical enquiry which concerns the nature of Ultimate Reality. A Theology which cuts itself adrift from the world of philosophic thought—especially if it persists in an agnostic attitude towards these questions—seems to be in danger of losing objectivity and depth. There are, it is scarcely needful to point out, philosophical constructions which have little in common with Christian Theology ; but there are few of them which do not

emphasise elements of reality that Christian Theology cannot safely ignore. One thing is certain: the appeal to experience must not be too narrowly based. The Experience on which the Christian thinker constructs his doctrine of God must include all phases of our outlook on Reality. It does not mean merely the experience of the individual pious soul: it includes likewise that religious heritage which the Church hands down through the generations with its background in Scripture and in human experience. The great superstructure of Christian Theology necessarily has its foundations laid broad and deep on the massive rock of the varied experiences of the human soul in touch with Reality. Ethics and Metaphysics—*i.e.*, the problem of conduct and the general problems of Reality, must be correlated in this great endeavour with the religious consciousness and its interpretation.

The concept of God appears, in some form, in all the great philosophical systems where the spiritual life of man as a spontaneous, freedom-loving, and fruitful fact and process is recognised. Christian Theology should not be content with any narrower and more restricted basis than that just indicated. It has affinities with all facts and methods which reveal the truth about the Universe in which man lives his life. It is deeply concerned with man's salvation, with his struggle against sin, and his quest of holiness; but it likewise recognises that truth and beauty are also Absolute values in his life, and can only be neglected to the impoverish-

ment of man's spiritual nature and to the detriment of his apprehension of the real world of which he is a member. The experience with which the Christian thinker deals must be broad-based in the wide stretches of human experience.

The modern world in all departments of its activity has manifested a keen interest in facts and experiences of the phenomenal world; and this has been abundantly apparent also in the realm of theological study. The present age is one of specialisation among students of Theology and Religion, when intensive study is given to limited and clearly-defined historical and dogmatic problems, more especially as regards the literary and critical analysis of historic documents. But to-day we await with great longing for something more—viz., the touch of the synthetic and creative mind in the realm of pure Theology.

But this return to experience—in religion as elsewhere—is of utmost significance. It touches our present subject intimately. Bradley's admission about feeling reminds us that there are experiences—intuitions and feelings dimly perceived and not readily analysable—present, not always at the focus, but often at the periphery of consciousness, which are nevertheless of importance for our knowledge of God. The existence of these states suggests to us that Reality cannot be fully and adequately apprehended by any conceptual system however splendidly articulated. There are visions, symbols, intuitions, and feelings which, while less precise

and clear-cut in their nature than concepts, are yet individual and unitary in their epistemological character. They afford another way of insight into the Divine Reality than that of conceptual knowledge. Speaking of Plotinus, von Hügel says: "What is here so specially valuable is doubtless Plotinus' constant vivid sense . . . of the real contact between the real God and the real soul, and of the precedence and excess of this contact before and beyond all theories concerning this, the actual ultimate cause of the soul's life and healing. Indeed, reality of all kinds here rightly appears as ever exceeding our intuition of it, and our intuitions as ever exceeding our discursive reasonings and analyses." [1]

Now it is to the consideration of these states that we wish to give attention, first of all. That they exist is not to be doubted. An examination of the experience of religious souls clearly reveals them; more especially do the mystics lay stress on them. Such states are called "intuitions" or "feelings," according as their intellectual or their emotional quality is emphasised. Both these words—intuition and feeling,—in their ordinary as well as in their philosophical usage, are liable to great variation in meaning; but it is not easy to avoid their use. "Intuition" is used of the "inspiration" of the artist and poet; the flash of insight, partly perceptive, partly emotional, which emerges in consciousness as a kind of "creative seed" from

[1] Von Hügel, 'Eternal Life,' p. 86.

which shall spring the perfect flower of a great work of art. Such "insight" has a vitality and spontaneity of its own, quite different from the laboured processes of the intellect; it is likewise characterised by a unity, a simultaneity, a wholeness which marks it off from the piece-meal bit-by-bit working of the ratiocinative reason. How delicate and intangible these experiences are may be seen from such a passage as this from Augustine's 'Confessions'[1]:—

> "What now do I love, whenas I love Thee, O Lord? Not the beauty of any corporal thing; not the order of times; not the brightness of the light which we do behold, so gladsome to our eyes; not the pleasant melodies of songs of all kinds; not the fragrant smell of flowers and ointment and spices; not manna and honey; not limbs pleasant to the embracement of the flesh. I love none of these things, whenas I love my God: and yet I love a certain kind of light and a kind of voice and a kind of fragrance and a kind of meat and a kind of embracement, whenas I love my God; who is both the light and the voice and the sweet smell and the meat and the embracement of my inner man: where that light shineth into my soul which no place can receive; that voice soundeth which Time deprives me not of; and that fragrancy smelleth which no man scatters; and that meat tasteth which eating

[1] X.[6], Loeb's edition, vol. ii. p. 87.

devours not; and that embracement clingeth to me which satiety divorceth not. This it is which I love, whenas I love my God."

St Augustine, in this passage, uses the sensational elements of our experience as a means of expressing the emotion of the "Love of God," at once by way of pointing out their similarity and contrast. This "Love of God" is comparable to the sensuous elements of experience that afford pleasure and bring satisfaction, though not to be confounded with those data. The "pure" pleasures of the senses are akin, and yet different from the crowning emotion of the "Love of God." They find their fulfilment in that emotion; while that emotion sends its reverberations through the whole physical structure of man. The Love of God touches "body" as well as Soul in their intricate co-ordination. It is the sublimated form of all physical sensuous pleasures. But while it may be true, as Professor J. B. Pratt insists, that "religious emotion, like every other emotion, has a large sensuous element," [1] yet the point of more importance in this passage is that while such sensations as those of light and sound, &c., are comparable to the profound emotion—the Love of God,—yet they are essentially different. It is a defect in much psychological work on the feelings and emotions that, while it lays stress on the similarities between the various emotional elements in experience, yet it fails to investigate in detail their distinctive differences. Augustine's

[1] 'The Religious Consciousness,' p. 344.

skill as a psychologist here delivers him from the deception of misleading classifications as to the real nature and content of an experience—like that he here analyses,—the soul's Love of God.

The sensational elements of which St Augustine speaks, as well as the emotion of the Love of God, have two elements in common, (1) that both have an objective or trans-subjective reference, and (2) produce a pleasurable or joyful mood in the experiment. While here we see the qualities which these diverse mental states share in common, yet we have not yet taken sufficient account of their differences. The difference which concerns the nature of the trans-subjective reference will be discussed later. At present it is needful to bear in mind the two characteristics which I have just mentioned. Professor Pratt quotes Tauler to illustrate this two-fold aspect of the "feelings" or "intuitions" of which the mystics speak. "The man who truly experiences the pure presence of God in his own soul knows well that there can be no doubt about it." This knowledge comes only "through experience of entering in and dwelling in the Inner Kingdom of God, where the pure Truth and the sweetness of God are found." [1]

The "pure Truth" and the "Sweetness of God" of Tauler's description, correspond to what, in the language of modern psychology, is known as "cognition," or better "intuition" and "emotion," or more vaguely "feeling." In this matter the pre-

[1] Cp. Rufus M. Jones, 'Studies in Mystical Religion,' p. 281.

Reformation "Friend of God," John Tauler, is in agreement with the African Bishop of Hippo. The experiences of which they speak are steeped in emotional colouring, and at the same time bring insight or certainty to the soul. "These divine men" (the Friends of God), Tauler says, "enjoy an enlightened understanding," and likewise "they gain an inward peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." [1] But, adds Professor Rufus Jones, using phrases drawn from Tauler, "this knowledge is not something to be learned from the 'Masters of Paris'; it can come only through *experience* of entering in and dwelling in the Inner Kingdom of God, where pure truth and the sweetness of God are found." [2]

This analysis of the mystic's states of intuition brings us to consider the place of reason in such states, and in religious experience in general. The general principle which such analysis brings to light is this—viz.: "The work of Reason begins in our experience, at another level than that of logical and ratiocinative thought." As I have said, there are supplementary factors in our apprehension of religious truth—*i.e.*, supplementary to reason. These supplementary factors are not to be considered as non-rational. It would seem that the mind has to employ a more delicate and sensitive organ of apprehension and insight as regards certain spheres of experience, than that of the ordinary logic of ratiocination and the syllogism. The term generally

[1] Rufus Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 277. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 281.

used to express this mode of apprehension is "intuition." This mode of apprehension is not to be considered as higher than that of reason (it is almost impossible to apply the idea of higher or lower to these phases of our mental life), and is not antagonistic, but rather supplementary to Reason. The mystics at times speak as if the relationship between reason and their intuitions were wholly one of antagonism; but that view, I think, cannot be substantiated. Spinoza considers that "Scientia Intuitiva," the third phase of knowledge (according to his system of knowledge), completes the imperfect work of the other phases, mainly ratiocinative in character; and, as he adds, in the vein of the mystic, "from this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible peace of mind." [1] This is Tauler's "pure Truth" and "the sweetness of God" in the terms of Spinoza's thought.

The teaching of Bergson concerning Intuition points in the same direction. "Intuition," according to this thinker, "is capable of following reality in all its sinuosities," and is thus a fitter instrument for grasping the "mobility" of Reality than is the Intellect. Bergson holds that "Intuition" can thus grasp the "flux" of material reality in a way that the ordinary concepts of science, the "fixed concepts" of the intellect, can never achieve. "The consciousness we have of our own self in its continual flux introduces us to the interior of a reality, on the model of which we must represent

[1] Prop. xxvii., Part V., 'Ethic.'

realities" by that "intellectual sympathy" which we call "Intuition."[1]

Doubtless the distinction between Intellect and Intuition is here drawn too sharply, as many critics of Bergson have pointed out; and its general philosophical application is different from the use I would make of it. But Bergson is here, I believe, emphasising a mode of apprehension which has been neglected by idealist and realist alike. "An invisible current,"[2] Bergson concludes, "causes modern Philosophy to place the soul above the idea"; but this is true, not only of modern philosophy, but likewise of the mystic's attitude towards the Divine Reality. They place "the soul above the idea"; and they reckon a direct apprehension of God by intuition, or by what St Augustine calls the "Summus aspectus"[3] of the soul, above a knowledge of Him by abstract conceptual thought. Not that these two mental attitudes are antagonistic; rather are they supplementary the one to the other. What St Augustine here calls "Aspectus" covers the real core of the meaning of the term Intuition. It is to be conceived as the ally of Reason, achieving what the latter cannot accomplish. They are two forms of the total functioning of man's Reason.

[1] 'Introduction to Metaphysics,' Eng. trans., pp. 58-59.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

[3] C. Butler, 'Western Mysticism,' p. 204, quoting St Augustine, 'De quant. anim,' pp. 74, 75: "The going to God—that is, to the very contemplation of Truth, the striving to grasp intellectually those things which truly and supremely are—is the highest act of seeing (*summus aspectus*) than which it has none more perfect or better."

One further point should be noted, a point which illustrates the dependence of intuition upon the intellect as well as its independence. The intuitions of the Mystics, those supreme moments of vision that flash upon their souls, as the ultimate satisfaction of their spiritual quest, have their content and character determined in part by the categories and concepts with which the individual mystic is already familiar. This may be illustrated from St Augustine, whose religious outlook, up to and beyond his acceptance of Christianity, is determined by Neo-Platonism, which was his schoolmaster to Christ. In a well-known passage of the 'Confessions'[1] he writes: "Et pervenit ad id, quod est, in ictu trepidantis aspectus": "in the flash of a trembling glance ('intuition') my mind came to 'Ultimate Reality'—'that which is.'" It was a momentary apprehension of Reality—"something of which he perceived the odour, but was not yet able to feed upon." In this case the Intuition is qualified by the philosophical knowledge with which St Augustine was familiar through his study of Plotinus; but we must further notice that the intuition itself is the culminating point of the whole quest, adding a supreme illumination to the soul, the convincing grasp of Reality, the sense of God. "And being admonished to return unto myself, I entered even into my inmost self, Thou being my guide. I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul, above the same eye of my soul, above my

[1] 'Conf.,' vii.[17] (Loeb's edition).

mind, the light unchangeable [lux incommutabilis] . . . and Thou didst beat back the weakness of my sight, streaming forth the beams of light upon me most strongly, and I trembled with love and awe." [1] The thought of St Augustine is coloured in this passage by terms partly Platonic and partly Johannine—*e.g.*, the "Light" of the 4th Gospel, and the "unchangeable" which is doubtless Platonic. But, in any case, St Augustine was free from that negative tendency of thought which later dominated so much of the thought of the Mystics, owing to the influence of the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius, a Christian Neo-Platonist writer of the sixth century. The Ultimate Reality which St Augustine reaches, by the supreme act of the soul, is not an Absolute of Negation, attained by means of the "Via Negativa," but a Divine Being with positive attributes such as Light, Truth, and Love according to the characteristic method of the New Testament, with, as I have said, a background of Neo-Platonic Metaphysics.

What, then, of Intuition as I have attempted to define it? In what way does it differ from other acts of mental apprehension? It is a mental act appropriate to the apprehension of the Presence of the Divine Life and Will. It is an act of apprehension, not by abstract concepts, but by "direct immediate" contact of the soul with God. This is most evidently the constant claim of the Mystics throughout the ages. The word "immediate"

[1] 'Conf.,' vii.[10] (Loeb's edition).

has been used, though I have already urged that the "immediacy" of the mystical intuition is qualified by the "mediacy" of the philosophical or theological thought already in the mind of the individual mystic. Intuition gives the soul a new "immediacy," a new "integration" of its spiritual insight, whereby the abstract terms of philosophical and theological insight are incorporated in a direct apprehension of God. The Mystic thus completes the work of the philosopher and theologian, and goes a stage beyond; his Divinity is no longer a doctrine but a life, the Life of the Great Fellowship. Himself perhaps neither philosopher nor theologian, he yet inherits the work of these thinkers. The spiritual traditions of which he is the heir form the background of his mental life, and determine in part the content of his mystic insight. But in all cases the Mystic makes his own contribution to what he has been taught by tradition. He walks in untrodden paths while pursuing his mystic quest; and he finds what no mere tradition can give him, a passionate personal apprehension of God in a moment of vivid and direct insight.

Pascal underwent a great spiritual crisis (what is generally known as his second conversion) in the year 1654, on Monday, 23rd November—a record of which was found after his death on a scrap of parchment within the lining of his doublet,—verily a most moving document.

"From about half-past ten in the evening till about half an hour after midnight," so it runs.

I introduce it here because it illustrates the point that I am making.

— Fire. —

"God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,
Not of the philosophers, and the learned,
Certitude, Certitude, Emotion, Joy, Joy, Peace. . . .
Forgetfulness of the world and all outside of God, . . .
The world hath not known Thee, but I have known Thee.
Joy, Joy, Joy, Tears of Joy! . . .
My God! Wilt Thou leave me?
Let me not be separated from Thee for ever. . . ."

Here is the record of a tremendous experience hurriedly written down, while the memory of these two bewildering and rapturous hours loom still fresh. Nothing but the main outlines are given, interrupted by the joyous cries of the soul. Stress is laid on the uniqueness of the experience and its amazing difference from any merely philosophical apprehension of God. "Not of the philosophers and the learned!" Not after this manner does the philosopher grasp the Reality after which he gropes. The "Intuition" of God, as the foundation of religious experience, is disparate in character from the philosopher's apprehension of the concept or Idea of God. Here we probe down to the root difference between religion and philosophy, of which more will be said in the sequel. The certitude of the religious spirit in its apprehension of God is not to be confused with the coherence of philosophic thought. It is a thing "per se." Philosophy may

help in the elucidation of the intuitions and insights of religious experience, but it can never replace religious experience and its direct intuitions as Gnostics in other ages and Hegelians in our own have urged.

It suffices to say this at present as regards the difference between religion and philosophy and their interrelationship. Meanwhile it is necessary to point out in connection with the evidence of Pascal's remarkable record that this new "certitude," "emotion," and "joy" have been awakened in a great philosophic soul whose past insight would still qualify that which was new in his experience. Pascal's philosophic outlook and temper still remained with him to use in the service of the new religious certitude and the fresh "Intuition" of God, which had invaded his spirit on that memorable November night in the year 1654.

"The most refined Mysticism," writes Professor Rufus M. Jones,[1] "the most exalted spiritual experience, is *partly* a product of the social and intellectual environment in which the personal life of the mystic has been formed and matured." Following out this line of thought, suggested to him by the writings on Mysticism of Delacroix in his 'Etude d'histoire et de psychologie du Mysticisme,' Professor Jones adds: "Mystical experiences will be, perforce, saturated with the dominant ideas of the group to which the mystic belongs, and they will reflect the expectations of that group and that

1 'Studies in Mystical Religion,' Intro., xxxiv.

period." Needless to say, they will reflect even more decisively the past history and mental background of the individual who has known some phase of the Mystic's experiences.

Now there is much in these statements and in the previous discussions which links itself with Schleiermacher's 'Speeches on Religion to its cultured Disciples,' and the doctrines there enunciated, especially those concerning the Nature of Religion in speech II. in the form it presented in the first edition (1799) of that famous book. Schleiermacher in this section of the book is endeavouring to make clear how religion is to be distinguished from Philosophy on the one hand, and Ethics on the other. This task had to be accomplished in that age in the interests of clear thinking, especially in view of Kant's reduction of religion to a kind of "addendum" to ethical theory, whereby the independent vital life of religion was deprived of all genuine reality. On the other hand, the opposite danger had to be obviated—*i.e.*, the identification of religion with philosophy.

In the spirit of the Romantic Movement of his Age [1] Schleiermacher reminds his readers that "Religion is sense and taste for the Infinite." Setting aside, for our present purpose, the fact that Schleiermacher is here, in his philosophical terminology, under the influence of Spinoza—whom he calls "the holy rejected Spinoza,"—we note the further progress and elucidation of his

[1] Sch. on Religion (Oman's Trans.), p. 39.

thought in the saying: "If man is not one with the Eternal, in the Unity of Intuition and Feeling, which is immediate, he remains (in the unity of consciousness, which is derived) for ever apart." [1] This is the mystic note and the Mystic's claim. "Recollect," he further says, "that each intuition from its very nature is linked to feeling." [2] Religion is thus to be distinguished from Philosophy and from Ethics. It is a third (Philosophy and Ethics being the other two) distinctive type of conscious attitude towards the facts and values of Life. Akin to Philosophy and linked with the ethical life, as it necessarily is and must remain, yet it is a unique and qualitatively different apprehension of Reality. It is the apprehension of a spiritual Life, as the Ultimate Reality, with whom we may enter into personal relationships.

In later editions Schleiermacher is inclined to lay somewhat exclusive stress on the "feeling" side of religious experience, but, as I have endeavoured to show, his earlier declaration that both "intuitions and feelings" are discoverable in the experience of the religious soul is nearer the truth, as analysis reveals. They are interdependent and equally involved in the life of religion. "Intuition," he wrote in the first edition, "without feeling is nothing." [3] This teaching proclaims that the religious feelings are associated with, and cluster round, an Intuition of God. It bases itself on the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 40. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 280.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 281.

fact that mental life is a unity, and that religious experience is no mere affair of the feelings or emotions. Our Intuitions and apprehensions of God—not to be denied the status of knowledge—react on the soul by awakening our deepest and most exalted emotions. Religious Experience involves knowledge, but not in the first place that of discursive reasoning, but rather the immediate "intuition and feeling" of God, which is the real foundation of all religious knowledge.

Such intuitions play a double rôle. In the life of the individual they appear as the culminating point of the history of his religious experience. In truth they form the foundation of his religious life, the decisive apprehension of God; so that one will cry with Pascal: "Certitude, Joy, Certitude." But while this is true of the great company of those who have known at first hand the Divine touch upon their spirits, yet in just such moments, to souls specially equipped, or set in the midst of the great creative moments of spiritual experience, there may emerge intuitions which for ever belong to the treasures of man's knowledge of God. He who discovered that the "quādosh" of early Hebrew Religion meant "moral holiness," and not merely "ritual purity," was such a pioneer in the true way of Divine apprehension; so, too, was that thinker who, summing up the mind and thought of Jesus, uttered those pregnant phrases, "God is spirit"; "God is love." On such intuitions, as

the foundation stones, is laid the Temple of our Christian faith.[1]

[1] A similar position to that here enunciated finds a brilliant exposition in Professor A. N. Whitehead, who writes: "As if touched by a spark, a very few persons, one, two, or three, in some particular province of Experience, express completely novel intuitions. Such intuitions can be responded to, analysed in terms of their relationships to other ideas, fused with other forms of experience, but as individual primary intuitions within their own province of experience they are not surpassed."—'Religion in the Making,' p. 120; cp. p. 129.

LECTURE II.

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

"Science has done us a great service in brushing the idle dust of superstition from our culture and in cleaning up the windows that look out upon the physical world. It has been arrogant enough in its work, too arrogant for many members of the human family. But now there is peace, and the greatest workers are often the most modest of all. When the greater work of clarifying the windows of the soul begins apace, must arrogance again set in?"[1]

It is necessary at this stage to look at mystical experience from the point of view of the Psychologist. Psychology deals with these experiences as mental states—that is, without reference to their "meaning or significance"—as expressing or interpreting an extra-mental reality. It looks on these states as in association with others and to be explained in terms of the mental processes themselves, without reference to anything beyond. According to the principles of a true scientific method, it is right in doing so; otherwise only confusion would reign, and psychology as a science

[1] H. J. Watt, "Review of J. H. Leuba's Psychological Study of Religion," in the 'Journal of Theology and Philosophy,' vol. viii., No. 12.

would be impossible. This is true, so far as psychology is concerned, of all phases of mental life, sensations, ideas, and emotions. "The perennial problem of the study of mind in terms of itself remains unobscured through all advances of knowledge, and it can be finally and completely successful only in so far as the realm of mind remains autonomous territory." [1]

This task the pure psychologist pursues, refusing to explain the data of psychology in terms of physiology on the one hand, or in terms of theology or philosophy of religion on the other. Its hypotheses are framed in terms of mental processes, and not otherwise. The writer I have just quoted insists that "the centre of gravity in any study called psychology must lie in the mind." [2]

But while it is vital to remember this as regards all departments of psychological investigation, even in regard to the psychology of religion, yet the investigation which at present occupies our attention must look further. We are dealing with mental states which have, according to those who experience them, "a trans-subjective reference." It is highly important to bear this in mind as regards any study of the religious consciousness. Such states steadily and universally retain this reference. To ignore this reference is to misunderstand entirely

[1] H. J. Watt, 'The Sensory Basis and Structure of Knowledge,' p. 4.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. i.

the character or quality of such experiences. Even when these states seem to be entirely emotional in character—*e.g.*, love or awe—this objective reference cannot be neglected. Such love or awe is definitely a love of God or awe in the presence of God. To ignore the distinctive reference of such a characteristic mood of the religious soul is to change entirely its quality and to miss its significance.

In face of such mental states we are at once called to consider the realm, or facts of being to which they point. Otto, in his volume translated in English as the 'Idea of the Holy,' points out that the feeling of the "numinous," which he characterises as a "primary immediate datum of consciousness,"[1] yet has "immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self."[2] He further adds, "This is so manifestly borne out by experience that it must be about the first thing to force itself upon the notice of psychologists analysing the facts of religion." He likewise finds a collaboration of his views in the "naïve" passage of William James' 'Varieties of Religious Experience,'[3] where it is stated, "It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of Reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existing realities to be originally revealed." In this we have the problem

[1] Page 11, note. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 10. [3] Page 58.

set which every student of the meaning or interpretation of the religious consciousness is compelled to face, and to endeavour to answer.

This problem may be looked at more broadly. This trans-subjective reference is implied in our ordinary emotional states. Fear for an animal or man is fear of some one or something. However any particular experience of fear may be related to the antecedent experiences of the individual, this reference to an " object " outside the self cannot be ignored.

" The emotive system would be ' all in the air ' if it were isolated from the sensory-cognitive system. Our feelings and sentiments would be all about nothing whatever." [1]

Now it is just a suspicion that religious experiences and moods are all " about nothing whatever," which some writers on the psychology of religion tend to produce in the mind of their readers. Hereby they tend to cause sharp disappointment with the work they have so far achieved in this field. But a reference to a world beyond ourselves is clearly implied in all the varied experiences of the human mind in cognition, in volition, and in emotion.

Among psychologists, the so-called behaviourists, who lay stress on the active quality of mind, are concerned to give prominence to this objective quality of our mental states, at any rate as regards those of volitional or emotive type. But a psy-

[1] H. J. Watt, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

chology which minimises or ignores this reference proves its incompetence to deal with the ordinary reactions of our mental life upon the world of fact, as well as with the great reaction of the soul as discovered in the experiences of religion. Religion will, if this reference is not noticed, collapse like a house built on the sands of subjective moods and affirmations. But it is more than a vast realm of unreal, fantastic, spiritual values. It is not merely "in the air" as some psychologists and traditional rationalists would have us believe.

Professor Pringle-Pattison quotes M. Fouillée as declaring in a happy phrase "that the terror of the subjective is an obsession introduced into philosophy by Kant." [1] This obsession captured the minds of some psychologists and has been used as an instrument of criticism in the realm of religious experience. But it is surely true that if such a method in its application brings such disaster and disintegration to a great section of our human experience, then something is wrong with this method as has been again and again pointed out as regards its use by Kant in reference to the general problems of knowledge.

In short, the matter passes out of the hands of the psychologist, valuable as his treatment of religious experience of the soul may have proved to be. A psychology which minimises the problems by squeezing the life-blood from the living soul of re-

[1] 'The Idea of God,' p. 132.

ligion is entirely misleading and defective.[1] Doubtless at times the psychologist, in his effort to think out his problems critically and with precision, may find the language of writers of religion and theology somewhat inexact, and at times overladen with a measure of rhetoric ; but this defect should not lead the psychologist to assume that he is confronted merely with pretty assertions and pious phrases signifying nothing. I have already attempted to state the problem which crops up at whatever points we touch the experience of the religious soul —*i.e.*, the question of the objective truth of such experience.

The present discussion may be further developed by consideration of a volume by an American writer on Psychology—namely, ' A Psychological Study of Religion,' by Professor James H. Leuba of Brynmawr College. This writer has done valuable work in the study of religious experience in a series of articles published throughout a long period of years. His opinions must always be weighed, and much may be learned from a study of his writings. In the preface to this volume he warns his readers to be prepared for outspokenness in matters of religious belief, and then adds : " I cannot persuade myself that frank dealing with religion can be detrimental

[1] This defect in the prevalent discussions on the psychology of religion is felt by Dean Inge, who says in his ' Plotinus,' vol. ii. p. 142 : " In limiting itself to the investigation of mystical vision as a state of consciousness, the psychology of religion excludes all consideration of the relation which the vision may bear to objective truth."

to society, even though the advent of psychological analysis and explanation should bring about a crisis more painful because more profound, than the one due to the less recent appearance of the comparative history of religions and the literary criticism of sacred writings." [1] In order to demonstrate his quality as a fighter for the truth, he points out " that what religion has most to fear is intellectual timidity and intellectual dishonesty among the supporters of the established cults." [2] During much of his discussion he has in mind and quotes with approval an interesting saying of Theodore Flournoy of Geneva : " Le conflict entre le christianisme et le science a éclaté d'abord sur la terrain cosmologique : . . . la lutte s'est transportée ensuite sur la terrain de la biologie : il se trouve maintenant sur celui de la psychologie." " The conflict between Christianity and science broke out, first of all, in the realm of cosmology ; the struggle was then transferred to that of biology ; now it appears in the domain of psychology."

But in the end even Flournoy does not satisfy this eager combatant, for the Genevan thinker admits, with what seems to me admirable insight, " Psychology neither rejects nor affirms the transcendent existence of the religious objects ; it simply ignores that problem as being outside its field." [3] But this moderation of thought does not commend itself to Leuba. It is inexcusable, he urges, in an

[1] Preface, p. ix. [2] Preface, p. ix.
[3] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 245,

eminent psychologist like Flournoy to deal so mildly with the "muddle-headed people" who write out treatises on theology and philosophy of religion.[1] Flournoy has urged a point of view for which there is much to be said—that psychology deals with the inter-relation of mental states to each other as regards their dependence and association one with another, but does not concern itself and, ex hypothesi, as a science does not need to concern itself, with their significance as knowledge, insight, or as bearers of objective or transcendental significance. In short, the epistemological and ontological questions remain after psychology has done its work, and they have to be dealt with otherwise than by the usual psychological methods. But Leuba has a way of avoiding this issue.

Flournoy, in the passage we have just quoted, has been finding support for his teaching in a saying of Ribot's, that "the religious feeling is a fact which psychology simply analyses and follows in its transformations, but it is incompetent in the matter of its objective value."

Here is the point at issue, and Leuba hastens to give battle. "Professor Flournoy is right if the God of religion is really a metaphysical God, absolute, infinite, impersonal. In that case science is certainly incompetent. But if, on the contrary, the object necessary to the religion of Professor Flournoy, and to religion generally, manifests Himself to

[1] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

human consciousness, if He reveals Himself in inner experience, and if faith in Him is based upon these facts, then He is an empirical God and belongs to science. The fundamental problem confronting us is then whether the God of the religions is the Impassable, Absolute, whose existence is established by metaphysical arguments, or whether He is a being whose objective reality is demonstrated by the production of peace, joy, strength, righteousness, and other results of that order in those who commune with Him." [1]

Now this separation between metaphysics and religious experience, between a metaphysical and what he calls an empirical God, runs through Leuba's whole criticism and discussion of religious psychology. He says even more abruptly and concisely : " There are two God-ideas that are as distinct in content as they are in origin ; a metaphysical idea which has nought to do with religion ; and an empirical, which belongs to religion." [2] This is to use the axe to our experience with a vengeance. Such teaching implies a divorce between metaphysics and religion which is destructive of a valid metaphysic, and likewise of a vital religion. A metaphysic which ignores the data of religious experience and a religion which stands aloof from the age-long quest of philosophy are both truncated and one-sided approaches to Reality. Neither

[1] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 246.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 246.

stands alone. The Absolute of metaphysics is a conception which owes much to religious experience ; nor can religious experience be considered as an element in human life without relationship to the ultimate Metaphysics. Religious experience, I believe, is built on reality as its foundation stone, and desires to keep in touch with it throughout its history. One of the greatest services of the Fourth Gospel to religion lies in its protest against the separation of these two great phases of experience—metaphysics and faith. In the phrase " the Word became Flesh " (St John's Gospel, i. 14), we have the gainsaying of any such dichotomy of human experience as a permanent spiritual attitude. There are systems of metaphysics which entirely discount the religious experience ; but they stand condemned because they deal with experience only in a partial way. Before one condemns any elements of experience as illusory, as Leuba here does, one must be very sure that significant and veracious elements have not been neglected. Experience, especially that vastly important sphere of experience which we know as religion, must be carefully examined and evaluated in all its reaches and departments, in its life history and purpose, and any attempt to foreclose this enquiry by the abrupt methods of theoretical generalisation is to be condemned. But it is difficult to consider religious experience even at the threshold of religion in its primitive forms without feeling that it points steadily towards Reality, and desires to come to grips with Reality

in every way possible to the human spirit, practically, theoretically, and æsthetically.[1]

Religion has sought alliance with the great human effort " to think things out," and it does so, believing that the practical interests of life, among which we include religion, are not to be separated from the theoretical or metaphysical interests, or indeed any other. Philosophy and religion are distinct in origin and in purpose, but a true philosophy of life, which must necessarily include religion, cannot be considered altogether distinct in content from religion. " So I would urge that religion and its expression in theology cannot stand apart from the more general questions of philosophy. While its own life is not to be endangered by the categories of a philosophy which neglects the religious spirit or threatens to dissolve it into illusion, its procedure raises such questions of the nature and activity of God as cannot be answered simply on its own terms." [2]

This means, as I conceive it, that religion as such

[1] It is difficult to know what precisely Leuba means by saying the " empirical God of religion belongs to science," unless it is a begging of the whole question. Further, his conception of science in this reference needs further elucidation. Science surely is the attempt to examine all the facts and uniformities of experience in a special section of our human experience, and to give them systematised treatment. It must wait for the evidence and not prejudge it. It must be just to all the facts and to their special character and quality. Is not the objective reference of religious experience just such an essential element to be thrown into relief and not ignored ? Its justification as a true interpretation of that Reality is a question to be dealt with by the philosophy of religion and not by the psychologist in a hurry.

[2] Mansfield College Essays, T. M. Watt, ' Religion and Philosophy,' p. 346.

is not a purely theoretical enquiry like philosophy, but rather a life inclusive of all we mean by worship, but at the same time a life which demands for its justification the support of man's total outlook on the world of reality. If religion centres its life upon God, it does so because it conceives the God in which it trusts to be the Creative Spirit, the Life-giving Spirit of the total realm of Reality, material and spiritual, with whom we desire to establish personal relations. Religion is eager to be in touch with man's living thought about the world, be this in science or philosophy. But, on the other hand, this is certain: "the contribution of the religious spirit to the knowledge of God, its definition of His nature in terms of moral and religious values, can be neglected only when the whole religious attitude is ignored." [1]

Leuba believes that he finds much to support his views in the teachings of the Ritschlian school. "To save religion," he writes, "Ritschl took the bold step of claiming a radical separation between Christian Theology with its value-judgments, and what he called theoretical knowledge. He alleges a specific difference between religious and non-religious knowledge." [2]

Further, Leuba writes: "Ritschlianism is the only recent system of theology which has given evidence of vitality." [3] There is little doubt that Ritschl's influence remained for a generation or

[1] T. M. Watt, *op. cit.*, p. 346. [2] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 207-8.

more very potent over many German, British, and American theological writers and teachers, but it is less certain that it was really a fruitful or vital force among those who welcomed it. It came into being as the development of the Kantian agnostic attitude with regard to metaphysics, and laid stress (1) on the moral law and conscience as the basis of its Theism, and (2) on the historic figure of Jesus Christ and the revelation of God through Him.

Herrmann of Marburg, its most popular and impassioned advocate in Germany, for many years fired the moral and religious enthusiasms and ideals of the many foreign students who crowded his lecture-room. His 'Verkehr des Christen Mit Gott,' with its warmth and glow, remains as an abiding witness to his spiritual power. Among our own countrymen, Dr P. T. Forsyth of London exercised the same kind of influence in his sermons, his teaching, and his books in England and Scotland. His "perfervidum ingenium" flamed and coruscated as he taught and lectured on the great religious themes, viewing them from the standard of Ritschl's teaching. But that the theology of Ritschl, despite the fact that a school that looked to him came into being, was vital and fruitful in the sense of grappling with the greatest problems of Theology in their widest bearings, as problems of metaphysics as well as problems of religious experience, cannot be substantiated. One thing it certainly did. It proclaimed and emphasised with insistent voice the centrality of Jesus for every Christian Theology.

" We are Christians because in the human Jesus we have met with a fact whose content is incomparably richer than that of any feelings which arise within ourselves—a fact, moreover, which makes us so certain of God that our conviction of being in communion with Him can justify itself at the bar of reason and conscience." [1] Or again, " The Church cannot allow herself to be placed permanently in a position where she must be separated from Christ if she is to be lifted into communion with God." [2] And yet again, " If Jesus Himself is to redeem us, we must be placed under His power." [3]

All this was a word in season. It needed saying to Theologians submerged by the metaphysics of Hegel and to historical students often grown sceptical as to the worth of the Gospels as historical documents. It was likewise a guiding light to all faithful souls troubled concerning the ultimate results of the historical criticism of the New Testament during an age that had passed through the negative phases of the Tübingen school. Without Jesus there can be no Christian Theology. If He be mythical, then Christian Theology is at the second remove from Reality. It is but the attempted rationalisation of a myth and religious experience begotten by a myth.

But even here, in his emphasis on the historical Jesus, the radical subjectivism of the Ritschlian school becomes manifest. " It is a fatal error to

[1] Herrmann, ' Communion with God,' pp. 36-37.
[2] Page 36. [3] Page 92.

attempt to establish the basis of faith by means of historical investigation." [1] Despite Herrmann's criticism of the mystics, that statement in its essence is a great mystic saying, so that Herrmann was perhaps more a mystic than he knew.

But this is the one position by which he seeks to free Christian teaching and experience from the clutches of the historical critics. Accordingly he adds: " the one thing which the Gospels will give us as an overpowering reality which allows no doubt is just the most tender part of all; it is the inner life of Jesus Himself." [2]

Now this " inner life " is mediated to us by the Christian fellowship or Church and by Scripture. But it is somewhat difficult to know the exact scope and character of that phrase, " the inner life." Does, we may ask, the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel give the same sense of " overpowering reality " as the Jesus of the Synoptics? And if not, is it greater or less? In any case, do we not stand in need of just such historical investigations as Herrmann deprecates? Is the inner life of Jesus more " tenderly " expressed in the Fourth Gospel than in the Synoptics, or *vice versa?* In fact, do the four Gospels give a completely faithful record of the teaching of Jesus, or do we differentiate between some portions of them as being more trustworthy than others? Or again, is the " inner life " of Jesus as adequately manifested in eschatological passages

[1] Herrmann, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
[2] Herrmann, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

of the Gospels as in the ethical, or in passages relative to our Lord's own self-consciousness? In short, while the "basis of faith is not to be established by means of historical investigation" (Herrmann), yet can faith do without such investigation? I do not think it can. This is what I mean by the incurable subjectivism of the school of Ritschl, and, in particular, of Herrmann. It is equally as impossible to cut off faith from the general questions of metaphysics as to sever our knowledge of what the "inner life" of Jesus really is from historical enquiry. Agnosticism as a general metaphysical doctrine seems to give the mind a leaning towards agnosticism even in historical questions. Subjectivism, in short, is a council of despair. Von Hügel speaks of Ritschlianism as being "essentially artificial and inadequate."[1] That it is a "vital" doctrine cannot be maintained. It yields to a psychologist like Leuba all the points he wants to make in his critical treatment of religious experience. As we have seen, that treatment results in complete scepticism as to the objective value of such experience. "There is nothing, for example, in the life of the Great Spanish mystic, St Teresa, whose celebrity is being renewed by contemporary psychologists. [He refers to the work of Henry Delacroix.] Not a desire, not a thought, not a vision, not an illumination that can seriously make us look to transcendental causes."[2] Such a sentence brings the doctrine of Leuba, with

[1] 'Eternal Life,' p. 330.
[2] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

regard to religious experience, to a fine point. But there is little doubt that, looking from *within* the religious experience towards its Divine object, each of these mental states compels consideration of the Divine Object to which they point, and further, that they are entirely meaningless without such reference.[1]

Leuba is anxious doubtless, as was Hume when dealing with the wider problems of external reality, to emphasise the inner reference and coherence of each mental state to its neighbours—that is, its predecessors and successors—in the stream of consciousness; or, in other words, to eliminate the "supernatural" or the "transcendental" as a causal factor in the succession of mental states. Psychological theories are alone admissible for this purpose. As the supernatural is of no value in the sciences of chemistry and physics and biology for valid explanation of scientific processes, so too psychology as a science must rule it out from the category of efficient causes. It explains nothing because it explains too much. To-day the "pure" psychologist turns his back on merely physiological explanations of conscious states and processes. "The time is due when psychology should set its

[1] Pringle-Pattison, 'The Idea of God,' p. 252: "Certainly in no sphere of our experience is the implication of objectivity—the truth claim as it has been called—more insistent, one might say, more overwhelming, than just in the moral and religious life. Reverence for the moral law, the self-humiliation caused by the failure to fulfil its demands, the sense of sin, the attitude of worship and utter self-surrender, are possible only if the subject feels himself in the presence of a Reality besides which all else pales into insignificance."

house in order and sweep it clear of physiological litter." [1] This is a justifiable demand from the point of view of a " pure " science of psychology ; and when this is granted, as it must be in increasing measure, we have no hesitation—for it has been allowed by all careful thinkers for a long time—in demanding the exclusion of the supernatural also from the *verae causae* of psychology. But it is one thing to exclude the transcendental from among the valid working causes recognised by psychology, and an entirely different matter to deny the reference of religious experience to a Transcendental Object whose Reality is thereby affirmed. Otherwise we are left with subjectivism as our working theory of knowledge, and the basis of our views of scientific knowledge as well as of religious. A view which says that in both cases, *i.e.*, science and religion, psychological study makes it obvious that there is only a mental side for the matter is rejected by all but a few men.

For the scientist, as for the religious believer, there is another side to human experience than the merely mental. To argue as if it were not so would be to stultify science as well as religion. Such a conclusion may well cause a halt to a negative and sceptical procedure of this type. To science as to religion there is another side than the mental : in the one case, the facts and processes of nature ; in the other, the transcendental reality, God. " He that cometh unto God must believe that He is, and

[1] H. J. Watt, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him " (Hebrew xi. 6).[1]

With regard to the question of the admission of the " supernatural " as a causal factor in the course of mental life, especially in the matter of religious experience, the following observations may be made. We have, it may be said, passed the day when " special creations " can be admitted as causal factors in the world's evolution. But it is important to notice that, as brought into play by those who maintain them, this appeal to " special creations " marked the limit of their powers of explanation, and likewise emphasised the fact that they were face to face with something totally new in the world of fact. Modern thought likewise shows the same caution in speaking of " emergent " evolution, thereby denominating the novel element in the long stages of evolution. As regards psychology, the supernatural as a factor in the explanation of mental phenomena may seem liable to the same objections as did " special creations " in the science of biology. Yet this admission does not, save on a theory of pure subjectivism, deny the soul's apprehension of the real divine Life and Being of God as a determinative fact in human life, and a presupposition of all our thought about the universe.

[1] " If man after man comes forward to testify that the world his soul lives in pulsates with the harmony of an intellect, a love, a life that is greater than his own, it will be of little avail for psychology to apply its smallest standard to that introspection to destroy it, to belie it, or to convert it into a belief that has no object."—H. J. Watt, ' Review of Religion and Theology,' p. 744, vol. viii.

And if religion presupposes and substantiates the view that real finite subjects live and move and have their being through the real Divine Life and Grace of God, and that finite spirits can attain, and persist in, communion with the Infinite God, is it contrary to all the actualities of that universe so conceived to affirm that the Divine Life has a decisive share in moulding and determining the spiritual life and history of these finite spirits? Difficulties may arise when we endeavour to trace out the method of divine operation through the ordinary laws of mental life; but to rule out its possibility and to deny its reality surely seems an arbitrary trespassing beyond the limits of justified denial and scepticism. The whole life of religion is here at stake. Religion from the human side claims to be a self-developing self-critical method of approach to divine Reality, which neither philosophy can replace nor psychology deprive of reality.

Religion seeks the aid of philosophic insight to widen and to correlate its thought with other methods of approach to the Reality of things. But it refuses to be ignored and belittled by being called "man's first crude imaginative mythical approach to reality." From within itself it produces an organ of criticism, and by its own standards it advances on the path of self-criticism and enlargement, without abrogating or setting aside the fundamental relationship between the soul and God with which it sprang into being, and by which its life persists. These two terms are its focal points of life and reality. If one—namely,

the human self—is transcended, or the human self treated as being only "adjectival" in existence, we have pantheism or acosmism in its varied forms. If the other, that is, God is banished as an outworn piece of metaphysic, or if the universe is conceived as having no Transcendent, Focal, Divine centre of life, then the resultant philosophy is of the character of positivism in its multifold forms. With reference to this, Von Hügel writes: "Whenever Christianity places man high, it never places him thus alone, but only as, and in so far as, penetrated and sustained by another—*the* Other, *the* Reality, God; and only in so far as man's mind and will vividly apprehend, and fully endorse, this contrast, necessity, grace, and Reality within and for man's entire existence." [1]

When psychology denies the soul's real apprehension of God, in the very act of denial it destroys the character and quality of the spiritual life which it sets out to understand. Professor Pratt half-humorously pleads with the psychologists of radical and destructive temper to remember that they are, by their assertion of the subjectivity of all religious experience—*e.g.*, of prayer,—destroying at the very source and fountain-head the living thing which they are engaged in examining.

Auto-suggestion is very often stated to be a known psychological causal process, sufficient to explain the character of religious experience. But is this really so? There may be some facts which point in this

[1] 'Eternal Life,' p. 229.

direction, especially in the simpler forms of religious practices. Auto-suggestion doubtless produces certain mental habits around which grow a certain number of beliefs or doctrines, and in thus operating within us may seem to adduce similar effects to that credited to Religion and its work in the soul. This, if it were indeed proved, would reduce religion to the status of a method of mind-cure or even worse.

Religion, it is certain, produces important effects on the individual who observes its method and cultivates its life. Who does not know the calming effect of the repetition of the Lord's Prayer or other phrases of Scripture in an hour of intense mental disturbance, in sorrow, anxiety, or the presence of death? But can this well-known result be explained in its totality by the subjectivism of auto-suggestion? It is difficult to think that such an explanation really does justice to the substance and content of religious experience. Did the real presence of God not "touch" the soul in such a moment of experience, would the result we know be just as we experienced? Without the real presence of God, can we have the true fruits of the Spirit? [1]

[1] Of Leuba's general point of view, H. J. Watt writes, 'Review of Religion and Theology,' p. 744, vol. viii.: "If we are to study religion scientifically, let us give up the 'biological' point of view that can let beliefs in non-existent objects play a part in the struggle for life. It is no part of the business of psychology to offer a new religion. It must accept religious beliefs, as beliefs, as they stand, and its true business is to show how these beliefs are produced, that is, to justify them as beliefs. For that purpose it must gain insight into them, not lose it, and still more, not destroy it."

One further point in Leuba's criticism of religious experience may be considered before we pass on. In his preface—which one takes to have been seriously written—he lays it down that "the gods of religion are inductions from experience," and are therefore proper objects of science.[1] By this generalisation Leuba would count his task achieved—namely, the ensnaring in a web of phenomenalism of the entire life of religion with its imposing structure of metaphysic, and according to Leuba, its uneasy manœuvring to elude its enemy, the science of psychology! It is amazing indeed that religious belief should be dignified by this writer as in any degree an induction, as being akin to any kind of logical procedure. What he really means is that religious belief is a rationalisation, clumsy and puerile in character, of the moods, emotions, and other religious phenomena which form its groundwork.

Now an induction from experience is, according to scientific standards of to-day, a proper object and aim of any legitimate science. At least it gives a high degree of probability. Science is everywhere on the lookout for such valid inductions as will lead to a more exact and extensive knowledge of the special realms of enquiry in question. If this is so as regards the great sciences, would it not likewise be a laudable achievement of religion, if its beliefs are seen to be inductions from experience? That would seem a great achievement

[1] Leuba, *op. cit.*, Preface, p. viii.

of religion, an achievement which could be verified by the tests of experience and its coherence with the rest of ascertained knowledge. "By their fruits ye shall know them." But it may be said this test yields no guarantee as to the Reality of the Object of faith. "Fetishes are trusted because their efficiency has been proved. Yahveh shows himself to be the true God by helping his worshippers to defeat the hosts of Chemosh. The Virgin Mary demonstrates daily her powers of intercession by serving those who address their petitions to her." [1]

All these divine figures are, according to Leuba, inductions from experience, like the hypotheses of science, but are yet as foolish and unsubstantial as are the childish credulities of the alchemist. "Theology," he concludes, "continues to bear to psychology a relation similar to that of alchemy to chemistry." [2] This is indeed a bad plight for the queen of sciences. "The theologians' respect for experience, and their use of it, is of a kind with that of the ignorant empiric in medicine." Blow succeeds blow, and one begins to wonder why theology did not disappear from the range of human interests with the decay of alchemy. This, of course, is an excellent example of the irascible scientist who wishes an easy victory.[3]

[1] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 259.
[3] "But who that knows and feels the complete harmony and consistency of souls that love is, would doubt the presence of its response? Here we have an object, a trans-subjective reference, a guarantee of immediate experience, a kind of coherence

"The truth is that empirical theologians have never intended to adopt scientific methods; incredible as it may seem, they have apparently never realised that to make inner experience the only source of religious knowledge means a surrender to psychological science." [1]

Science is a great and proud achievement of the human spirit, but scientists themselves are not always free from bias and prejudice, and even the splendid work of the great psychologists may be brought into contempt by some of their followers.

"Inner experience," in Leuba's phrase, doubtless means the characteristic phases of religious experience, its moods, emotions, and beliefs. But we may ask whether any of these items of inner experience stand unrelated to facts and realities beyond themselves. The ordinary emotion of fear is no mere piece of inner experience. Is it not always fear of something or some one? So doubtless with a fear which the religious soul describes as the fear of God. Or is that alone among emotional states without any such trans-subjective reference? "A feeling or emotion," writes C. C. J. Webb, "cannot properly be called religious which does not involve the consciousness that it is excited by and towards an independent reality." [2]

To this conclusion our discussion has so far

involving knowledge, feeling, conation, and all the rest."—H. J. Watt, 'Review of Theology and Philosophy,' vol. viii. p. 743.

[1] Leuba, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

[2] 'Problems and Relations of God and Man,' p. 71.

pointed, and if this indeed be so, does it signify that psychological science can alone deal with such experiences, and alone be considered sufficient for its analysis and interpretation? Only a prejudiced mind would make this claim. In religion the human spirit is not engaged in spinning webs among the dreamclouds of an unreal world, but in reaching out towards the *ens realissimum*, the life of the world, whose presence is manifest in every quest of the human soul in its search for truth, in its desire after holiness, and in its passion for beauty.

There are two philosophies of science, one false and the other true. Science that would entrap the world's life in the clutches of the thin categories of materialism; and science, or knowledge in its full sense, which traces out in detail the unique and lovely qualities of every portion and aspect of human experience. The one makes havoc of religious experience, while the other seeks to elucidate its essential spirit and to throw into prominence the qualities and contents which distinguish it from all other parts of human experience.

This holds good for the interpretation of intuition in its religious application. "Simul omnia videt," says St Augustine, of the divine intuition, grasping the whole of reality "uno intuitu." The intuitions of the religious soul are likewise after this pattern. The reality which it apprehends is given as a "totum simul," akin to the apprehension of æsthetic beauty rather than to the slow laborious processes of

reasoning. It is of the nature of insight rather than like deduction or even induction. It is a new integration of experience on the religious level accompanied by an immediate sense of God in the soul. It is human reason quickened in power till it is akin to the imagination of the poet and the artist, and the vision of the seer. We may further note with C. C. J. Webb "that we ought never to use intuition of obscure or vague apprehension, but only of something which can without absurdity be designated insight, immediate indeed, but clear." [1] Intuition is thus akin to reason; it is concerned with realities as is reason; it chiefly concerns the apprehension of the supreme Reality, as the mystics insist.

In the traditional English philosophy since the Essay of John Locke, it has been maintained that man has an immediate certainty or intuitive knowledge of his own existence. But as regards a knowledge of God, it was asserted that only by ratiocination is such knowledge possible. According to this view, the cosmological argument for the existence of God is "as certainly evident to a man who thinks as any conclusion in mathematics." Likewise as regards our knowledge of ourselves, according to Locke, this is also a rational inference, and not an immediate certainty or intuition. The same doctrine as regards a knowledge of others is upheld even to our own day by such a typically English thinker as the late Dean Rashdall of Carlisle in an essay

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

on "Religion and Philosophy." But this atomistic view of finite selves seems to be contradicted by the fact that in the experience of the child the consciousness of self and of "other" appear and grow together in mutual relationship. "We know ourselves not separately from our knowledge of others, nor others separately from our knowledge of ourselves, but both by a co-intuition."[1] Such "co-intuition" implies a consciousness of self and others more immediate and directly acquired than is suggested by the doctrine of Locke or Rashdall. The first object in the range of a child's experience is an object-self or "other"—its mother; so that we may say that the consciousness of self and the consciousness of "other" awaken together in the child's soul as a "totum simul" or a co-intuition. But the place of intuition in our apprehension of reality is further extended and enlarged by the mystic's claim that the knowledge of God, in supreme moments of experience, is also immediate and intuitive. This is the fundamental issue which the study of mysticism presses upon the student. It may seem to bring the religious issue in the sphere of epistemology to a fine point; but such a book as Leuba's, to which I have paid somewhat protracted attention, demonstrates that the critics of religious experience recognise that this is the living issue.

I do not argue that the mystic's claim is to be accepted without criticism or qualification. But it

[1] E. W. Hirst, 'Self and Neighbour,' p. 207.

certainly presents the issue as regards the quality and content of religious experience in its most striking form. We are warned to remember " that the objective validity of religious experience easily becomes a formula which serves no other purpose than to hide looseness of thought. All religious experience cannot be valid." [1]

But, as Mr Thouless later admits, it is impossible to assume that it is all invalid ; and it is important to recognise that religion has been ever eager to distinguish between the true and the false as regards prophecy or doctrine, and that the doctrine of evolution has put into its hands as in those of other realms of human experience a standard and method of self-criticism and self-correction. It is impossible, I believe, to separate religious experience from the rest of our complex and varied outlook on Life and Reality as if it alone were totally divorced from reality. That would be to fly in the face of all the age-long and persistent claims of the religious spirit. It cannot all be illusion, nor is it ensnared by the net of subjectivism. The urgent need is to distinguish the false from the true, the valid from the invalid. If it is true that all religious experience cannot be valid, it is likewise true that all religious experience cannot be invalid. But it is essential to maintain that religion equally with philosophy, though in a different fashion and by other methods, seeks to reach and apprehend the last Reality of

[1] R. H. Thouless, ' Introduction to the Psychology of Religion,' p. 266.

things. Its whole life and procedure means this. In its growth and development it has passed from crude and imperfect conceptions of God to attain an idea of God which should more harmoniously interpret the Divine Reality which it knows. Thus, while it is impelled to seek satisfaction for the needs of the human spirit in God, it likewise craves for a true knowledge of the Character and the Being of the God in whom it trusts. It seeks that it may find. For a time it may employ imperfect, nay, unworthy symbols, imaginative and conceptual, but these cannot abidingly satisfy man's religious and rational nature nor be adequate to the soul's communion with God and man's apprehension of God. In the last resort, can any conception of God be considered completely adequate? This question psychology cannot decide. That is the question of questions with which the philosophy of religion is alone competent to deal.

The students of the psychology of religion are prone to neglect this process of purification from error so clearly manifest in the history of a living religion, and to omit proper consideration of the development " from within " towards a truer apprehension of the divine Reality manifested in Christianity. The study of the " least common measure " of religious experience, wherever and whenever manifest, in whatever state of savage or civilised life apparent, will only result in the degradation of the higher to the level of the lower, and yield no true understanding of the significance and value of

the higher phases. "In the highest forms of religion," writes Principal Galloway, "the transcendent aspect of the Divine Object is recognised, and the supramundane nature of the human goal affirmed." [1] Again he adds very pertinently to our present discussion: "From the purely psychological standpoint, the religious consciousness in its reference to a Divine Object may or may not be illusory; and psychologists who have studied it differ widely on the question of its truth. It is well, however, to remember that the religious mind always postulates the truth of its experience; apart from this postulate the experience itself would not survive, though it does not follow that what the religious subject is impelled to treat as true is therefore true." [2]

The question of validity, he goes on to say, must be handed over to the philosophy of religion.[3] "So psychology, having done its work, hands over to philosophy the problem of religion, leaving it to say the last word on the truth of an experience round which gather man's fairest hopes as well as his darkest doubts."

This "inner urge" of the life of religion towards comprehension of and communion with the Divine Reality is an essential fact of religious experience which not even the psychologist of religion should overlook. It is essential for a true interpretation of the experiences to recognise this feature as a psychological fact. The further question as to the

[1] 'The Principles of Religious Development,' pp. 217-218.
[2] Page 219. [3] Page 220.

degree or measure of objective validity which such experience involves falls to be dealt with by a philosophy of religion.

In our study of intuition we have already reached a similar conclusion. Mr Thouless, when discussing the affective element in religious belief, speaks of "those forms of religion which rest largely on intuition, on the subjective feeling of certainty, such as Quakerism."[1] He then quotes, to illustrate his theory, a writer who is, I believe, not a Quaker but a student of Montauban, belonging to the French Reformed Church. Now though the term intuition is often used ambiguously, its distinctive use cannot be limited to what is merely "a subjective feeling of certainty." I am inclined to think that intuition is more intellectual in quality than affective, and accordingly not to be condemned as merely subjective. Quakers, as illustrated by such a writer as Professor Rufus Jones, would hold that intuitions as they appear in consciousness, with vivid and urgent force, should be tested by their coherence with known truth—viz., by rational considerations; while, at the same time, they should not be neglected lest new elements of truth, or of insight into Divine Reality, be overlooked and neglected. This sense of intuition is closely bound up with a conception of the Holy Spirit, who is verily a Spirit of Truth leading into all truth. This at any rate is the prime thesis of this course of lectures.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

Now, according to William James, "Noetic quality" is one of the four marks "which, when an experience has them, may justify us in calling it mystical." [1] Such experiences then of the mystic cannot be justly denominated simply "subjective feelings of certainty." Noetic quality, I take it, is equivalent to some measure of intellectual quality; even James himself later affirms "that mystical *truth* exists for the individual." [2] Truth is present here, and not simply a vague and blurred mass of feeling. Intuition is not always of the nature of the discovery of new truth, but often the personal discovery and domination in the individual soul of such truth as may long have been kept at arm's length, defied and scorned, now finally crowned by the vision of God. It was indeed so in the case of St Paul "when it pleased God to reveal His Son in me." [3] Its convincing power for the individual lies beyond doubt in the "noetic quality" of the experience; and it is true to say further that the intellectual content of such an experience has at last proved convincing, because on rational grounds, which are satisfactory to the individual, it has passed all the tests of being the truth. It fits in coherently with the rest of a man's intellectual and spiritual experience. It is the clue to the problem which has long tortured the soul.

But such truth may have seemed convincing to the intellect and yet may not have taken possession

[1] 'Varieties of Religious Experience,' p. 380.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 405. [3] Gal. i. 15, 16.

of the whole man as the dominating credo of life. To effect this, the soul's mastery by a truth, of which it is already on rational grounds convinced, is the further work of intuition. Intuition clinches the truth for the soul. Here truth makes its appearance, convincing heart and mind, the whole personality, now as it were, in Newman's words, "consumed yet quickened by the glance of God." In intuition the soul finds itself confronting, in a moment of intense spiritual vision, the truths concerning the divine reality of which the intellect had already imperfectly convinced it. Such a one may cry with Pascal "Not the God of the philosophers and the learned," but those blinding moments of intuition are not unprepared for by the lonely student's quest of intellectual insight as given by the great religious philosophies of the world—Platonic, Aristotelian, Spinozistic, Hegelian, Pantheistic, and Theistic. In intuition we discover the summary of the soul's progress towards the truth, the ripe fruit of its conscious and subconscious spiritual toil and struggle associated with its quest of God.

Professor James, however, maintains that such experiences possess likewise the mark of "ineffability"; a "negative" mark he admits, but characteristic also of other phases of our mental life such as appreciation of music or of "being in love." [1] They share this negative mark of ineffability as being too splendid and rich to be compressed

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 380.

into the hard and precise terms of common speech. How can the verbal counters fit for the affairs of common life compass the inexpressible moods of the musician, the lover, and the saint? But surely this is a characteristic which should not be overstressed. The literature of the world is full of just such efforts by the supreme minds of our race to utter the subtlest and deepest feelings of the lover; and music itself is the soul's endeavour to use sound so as to express the great emotions of the human spirit in their depths and their heights. Further, who shall say that the great spiritual geniuses of our race have not put into speech just the essence and heart of their mystic intuitive insight, so that they might communicate them to their fellows? They have told much, though of course much remains untold. "I know not, I know not," the mystic is fond of declaring; but surely the great religious traditions of Christendom, first of all made and shaped by its Creative Mind, then reillumined in the spirits of apostles, prophets, and teachers through the ages, are just the interpretation for common men of feelings and intuitions that came to them as ineffable experience. "We may exaggerate," writes Professor C. C. J. Webb,[1] "the incommunicability of a prophet's intuitions. They can and do communicate what they see—their intuitions." The writer of the Fourth Gospel makes Christ say, "All things which I have heard from my Father I have made known

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 81.

unto you." [1] And the same writer throughout his Gospel evidently regards it as characteristic of the supreme inspiration of Him whom he sets before his readers as the only-begotten Son of God; that it is no dim or obscure feeling for which words cannot be found, but a clear knowledge which, where fit recipients can be found, can be without reserve or hesitation imparted.

Further, this clear-sighted student of religious experience concludes by saying: "I do not think I am travelling beyond the facts in insisting that clearness, sanity, communicableness are marks of what is recognisably a higher inspiration, and obscurity, frenzy, and confusion of a lower." [2] This states a much-needed caution for students of the data of religious experience, warning them against the assertion of ineffability as an undoubted and fundamental mark of the mystic's experience. Yet "we may exaggerate the incommunicability of the prophet's intuition," [3] and this applies likewise to the mystics; when St Paul speaks of "a man in Christ" that he knew,[4] who, when "caught up into Paradise," heard "unspeakable words" (*ἄρρητα ῥήματα*),[5] he is not saying that these exalted moments of mystic experience are ineffable, but that they are those which it is "not lawful for a man to utter." In fact, this negative mark of mysticism, as William James calls it, may have received exaggerated im-

[1] St John, xv. 15.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 84.
[3] Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[4] 2 Cor. xii. 2-4.
[5] 2 Cor. xii. 4.

portance in the eyes of students, because of the connection of mysticism in some of its forms with the "via negativa." The philosophical application of the "via negativa" to the mystical experience has characterised certain phases of its history, and dates from the emergence into prominence of the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, a Christian Neo-Platonist of the early sixth century of our era.[1] Thus Pseudo-Dionysius writes: "Do thou in the intent practice of mystic contemplation leave behind the senses and the operations of the intellect, and all things that the senses or the intellect can perceive, and all things which are not, and things which are, and strain upwards in unknowing as far as may be towards the union with Him who is above all being and knowledge. For by unceasing and absolute withdrawal from thyself and all things in purity, abandoning all, and set free from all, thou wilt be borne up to the ray of the divine darkness that surpasseth all being." [2]

This tendency of mystic speculation towards "unknowing" and the "divine darkness" later came into prominence as a logic of transcendence, pointing to a doctrine of the transcendence of God among many mystics of the West, especially perhaps

[1] Otto, 'The Idea of the Holy,' p. 2, Eng. trans. "Even mysticism, in speaking of it as τὸ ἄρρητον, the ineffable, does not really mean to imply that absolutely nothing can be asserted of the object of the religious consciousness; otherwise, mysticism could exist only in unbroken silence, whereas what has generally been a characteristic of the mystics is their copious eloquence."

[2] "Mystical Theology," I., quoted by Dom Cuthbert Butler in 'Western Mysticism,' p. 6.

in the German group, of which the leaders were Eckhart, Tauler, and Suso. Indeed, Dom Butler makes this emphatic statement: "The doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius entered fully into the intellectual tradition of the West from the twelfth century onwards." [1] Students of philosophy scarcely need to be reminded of the place which this negative way holds in the Ethics of Spinoza, and later in English philosophy as an element in the dialectical structure of Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality.'

But as the "via negativa" is not the only method of philosophical thought, no more is it the only logic of the mystic. It is characteristic of a certain tendency within mysticism, but it is not the sole method. In proof of this we may consider the evidence of the Fourth Gospel. This Gospel, as well as St Paul, approaches these phases of religious experience from a different, a positive angle. As it has been said, "where they (the mystics of the negative way) say 'darkness,' St John says 'light,' and where St John says 'fulness,' they say 'void'; and St Paul stresses not ignorance but enhanced knowledge as the result of religious experience." [2] This is a sufficiently grand contrast between two mystic-ways, or rather two ways of interpreting the mystic's experiences, to make it clear that "ineffability" has not always been held to be a quality or mark of the mystic's intuitions. As Dom Butler points out in his elaborate study of the mystical

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 181.
[2] A writer quoted by Dom Butler, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

experiences of St Augustine, St Gregory, and St Bernard, there is a tradition of what he calls "western mysticism," which is quite distinct from that influenced by the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius with its method of the "via negativa": "for Dionysius the soul in contemplation is borne up to the ray of the Divine Darkness; for Gregory it endeavours to fix its gaze on the ray of the unencompassed light." [1]

This negative way is doubtless characteristic of one of the historic types of mystical piety and thought, and the writings of those under its sway may lend some support to the view that mystic states are ineffable in character. Yet on the whole this seems to be a one-sided development. "The negative road does not follow logically from the first principles of mysticism." [2] What it does achieve, however, is this. It gives emphatic expression to the soul's sense of the absolute transcendence of God. It takes delight in negative categories; it thrusts aside any positive affirmation which would link the infinite with the finite, and makes negativity an absolute category. It is this aspect of its inner logic which, I believe, is making its appeal to a certain school of thinkers in Germany to-day. God for them, as for the mystics of the Dionysian type and school, is the "wholly other" of whom nought may be predicated save in negations.[3] God for them is One who

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 181.
[2] W. R. Inge, 'Christian Mysticism,' App. A., p. 340.
[3] Cp. Otto, 'The Idea of the Holy,' Chap. v., pp. 29-30.

dwelleth in darkness, in super-essential non-being, in "the silent desert." Otto, in his 'Idea of the Holy,' uses, as the motto of the chapter to which reference has been made, Tersteegen's saying, "Ein begriffener Gott ist kein Gott." Such a view, of course, is an energetic protest from the heart of a passionate piety and spirit of sublime adoration against an exaggerated view of the immanence of God, which would merge His Being in the Universe. If this were the only way of asserting such transcendence, we might well be loath to set it aside. The idea of the transcendence of God is very near, nay, is essential to, the heart of Christian piety and theology, and forms an essential element in its idea of God. But transcendence may be safeguarded by a logical method less open to objection. "Does not," writes Otto,[1] "the distinguishing character of Christianity consist in just this, that God is near us, that we can possess and apprehend Him, and that man himself is His image and likeness? And yet we find this Father of the Church (Chrysostom) battling passionately, as for something that concerned the very essence of Christianity, for the view that God is the Inconceivable, the Inexpressible, that which gives denial to every notion. And this He does not do on speculative grounds, with the aid of the terms and phrases of any 'school' of theology: it is rather a sort of instinct in him that guides him with astonishing assurance and

[1] *Op. cit.*, App. I., p. 183.

accuracy to track out and collect the most wonderful texts of Scripture, so that their full weight becomes felt, as his profoundly penetrating interpretation explains and applies them." [1]

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

LECTURE III.

THE IRRATIONAL IN RELIGION

THE IRRATIONAL IN RELIGION.

The modern school of thinkers which has just been mentioned, of whom Professor Otto of Marburg is the leading figure, makes a somewhat different approach to the interpretation of religious life from that adopted by the mystics and theologians of the negative way. They are, like most moderns, psychologists first, and metaphysicians or theologians afterwards. It is on the basis of an exact psychological study that Otto sets forth his ideas on religious experience in his volume 'Das Heilige.' It is a very notable contribution to the study of religion, both because of its careful psychological analysis of the phenomena of religious life, and likewise because of its revolt from the too easy acquiescence of much modern theology in the idea of the immanence of God without sufficient regard to the complementary and profoundly Christian idea of his transcendence.

It is with the former part, its psychological aspect, that we would here deal. His profound analysis of religious experience makes a new beginning in the psychology of religion. He looks more narrowly at

the facts than do many students, and does not obliterate the unique quality and radiance of religious experience by classifying it with other emotions, intuitions, and experiences derived from other reaches of human life, as if classification preceded analysis instead of *vice versa*. This, I hold, is one of the dangers to which the student of psychology is liable when he turns to deal with specifically religious experience. Too often religious experience is levelled down to the usual categories of psychological classification, and left thus pigeon-holed without due analysis of its distinctive inner qualities. It is not looked at from within. It is not dealt with as if it had unique and special qualities of its own, as has the moral consciousness or the perception of beauty. This difficulty I have already sought to deal with in my discussion of the work of Professor Leuba. Likewise—a very valuable element in his work—Otto brings back the discussion of religious experience from dealing with abnormal and highly temperamental cases to consider the case of the normally equipped Christian believer. This fashion for the abnormal came into vogue with the writings of William James, so that it has seemed to many that the study of mysticism is the study of the abnormal, the purely temperamental. But with Otto we are brought back in our study of religious experience to the fundamental qualities of the believing soul.

Otto sets out to delineate the unique elements that distinguish religious experience from other

phases of our conscious experience. He is not concerned with the classification of it according to current psychological categories as to whether it be mere feeling or a combination of feeling and intellect. He looks at it from within as a student of æsthetics would analyse his perceptions of beauty, or an ethical writer his judgment of right and wrong. To do this he finds he has to create new terminology, otherwise the special features of religious consciousness might escape notice.

To put it in terms which we have already used, he asks, what is the fundamental intuition of the religious consciousness as a feature of normal human life? This fundamental feature, he maintains, is not derived from reason, but belongs to the non-rational elements of our nature. Thus in treating of the idea of the "holy," he says that ethics has adopted this idea, and qualified it by ethical judgments of good and evil. But specifically, he asserts, it is a religious idea. "While it is complex, it contains a quite specific element or 'moment,' which sets it apart from 'the rational' . . . and which remains inexpressible,—an ἄρρητον, or 'ineffabile,'—in the sense that it completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts." "The same thing is true," he adds, "of the category of the beautiful." [1]

This distinctive element in religious experience is everywhere present in the religious consciousness of mankind, though the rationalism of our theologies tends to obscure it. An enquiry into the meaning of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 5, Eng. trans.

the Hebrew term quādôsh, the Greek ἅγιος, &c., reveals that these terms, while later filled with ethical content, were in their earlier history "ethically neutral." To describe the quality which he thus isolates, Otto coins the word "numinous" from the Latin "numen." "I shall speak then," he says, "of a unique 'numinous' category of value, and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied. This mental state is perfectly *sui generis* and irreducible to any other; and therefore like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined." [1] This experience "cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes 'of the spirit' must be awakened." [1] In illustration, Otto quotes the passage in Genesis xviii. 27, in which Abraham ventures to plead with God for the men of Sodom: "Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes"; wherein he finds a profound creature-consciousness"—*i.e.*, the reaction produced by the numinous object on the mind of Abraham, because the numen is experienced as present, a "numen presens." "The numinous is thus felt as objective and outside the self." [2]

This argument of Otto's, developed in a fascinating way in the light of a profound knowledge of various types of religious experience, adds illumination to

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 7. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 9, 10.

the main plea of these present lectures concerning the objective character of religious experience. But the "objectivity" is even more narrowly defined. It is thus more positively stated in a footnote, p. 11: "This 'feeling of reality,' the feeling of a 'numinous' object objectively given, must be posited as a primary immediate datum of consciousness, and the 'feeling of dependence' is then a consequence, following very closely upon it—viz., a depreciation of the subject in his own eyes. The latter presupposes the former." It has been urged above that intuition is probably the best expression we have in our language for the basis of the mystic's experience for this awareness of the numinous. It delivers us from the ambiguity of the word feeling, which may be dismissed as merely subjective. Otto, when he deals with Schleiermacher's great definition of religion as a sense of absolute dependence, points out, as we have seen, that this sense of dependence is secondary to the awareness of the numinous divine. This awareness in its early stages is almost like a physical reaction, so direct and simple it is; but it is the elementary phase of a great development, like the mustard seed in the parable. Religion and literature speak of the spirit's "shudder" in the presence of the "mysterium tremendum," the alien and the uncanny, the "wholly other," before which the soul is wrapped in mingled mood of awe, fear, and love, repelled yet fascinated, as was Jacob by his unknown adversary.[1]

[1] Gen. xxxii. 24.

But this experience of the numinous holds the promise and potency of a rich growth, appearing, as Otto shows, in primitive as in the great historic religions, and remaining throughout as an element in the mind and faith of Christendom. Here is a genuine kind of knowledge, though different from conceptual knowledge. Its power of future growth is surely a mark of this. Though religion may be begotten in awe, yet it grows in grace and power by increasing in knowledge and being perfected in love.[1]

As Otto's translator writes in his Preface, p. xi.: "The primary fact is the confrontation of the human mind with a Something, whose character is only gradually learned, but which is from the first felt as a transcendent presence, 'the beyond,' even when it is also felt as 'the within' man." Dr W. R. Inge [2] has declared that "mysticism has its origin . . . in that dim consciousness of the Beyond, which is part of our nature as human beings." The history of religion, as of other human activities—*e.g.*, philosophy,—consists in the further definition of this "beyond"; but while philosophy is content with such definitions and interpretations, religion finds in this "Beyond" a Life by which the human

[1] The difference between conceptual knowledge and the knowledge of the numinous object here maintained may be illustrated by the contrast enunciated by the author of the 'Theologia Germanica' when he says: "The Perfect cannot be apprehended, known, or expressed by any creature as creature; but yet the Perfect does make its presence known in the soul when it is known, felt, and tasted of the soul."—Chap. i.

[2] Bampton Lectures, 'Christian Mysticism,' p. 5.

spirit is sustained, and with which throughout the reaches of its personality it can maintain living relationship and communion. Religion is more than knowledge, because he that knows considers that the object of his knowledge is simply beyond and without him; while he that worships and he that loves, as does the mystic, the saint, and the believer, knows that the object of his love and devotion is not only beyond but within him (transcendent yet immanent).

One difficulty doubtless will be felt because of Otto's use of the phrase "non-rational" to describe this type of experience. He is careful to define this use of the term—viz., that the "numinous" "completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts."[1] But are we justified in contrasting so absolutely this manner of knowing with knowledge of the conceptual or theoretical kind? Even so, would it not rather be true to say, as I have urged, that it is complementary rather than contradictory to reason. The numinous at any rate is the "datum" in this region of experience as the "beautiful" is the "given" in the realm of æsthetic apprehension and the "good" in the realm of ethics. From this matrix, this datum, different in each case, develop the great branches of human thought and action, religion, art, and morality. These form the groundwork of the "given," the "real," with which the human soul finds itself equipped. The soul does not make them, it discovers them. They are its links

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

with the Divine life of the world; indeed, the numinous experience takes precedence of the others I have mentioned—truth, beauty, and goodness. The latter bring the soul face to face with the unchangeable qualities of the Divine Life, but the numinous intuition or experience overshadows it with the Divine Life itself. Are we then justified in speaking of such an experience as non-rational or irrational? I think not, not even for the reason which Otto gives—viz., that such experiences "cannot be apprehended in terms of concepts." There are many experiences of which the same may be said, but it would be contrary to truth to hold them to be irrational. Otto himself seems to feel the justice of such criticism. "To know and to understand conceptually are two different things, are often even mutually exclusive and contrasted" [1] Yet he adds, "The mysterious obscurity of the numen is by no means tantamount to unknowableness. Assuredly the 'Deus absconditus et incomprehensibilis' was for Luther no 'Deus ignotus,' and so, too, St Paul 'knows' the peace which yet 'passeth understanding.'" [1]

This would seem to amount to a confession that religious experience forms a type of knowledge different from conceptual knowledge because more direct and immediate, yet veritably knowledge, and surely not to be accounted non-rational. "The numinous issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses." [2]

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 139. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

Working on the lines of Kant's Critique, Otto points out "that in the numinous we have to deal with purely *a priori* cognitive elements"; [1] further, these elements of experience, *a priori* in character, "are referred back to something still deeper than the 'pure reason'—viz., to that which mysticism has rightly named the 'fundus animae,' the 'bottom' or 'ground' of the soul (Seelengrund)." [2] The emphasis on knowledge in this passage is striking and emphatic, and seems to get rid of the idea of the non-rational in Otto's sense as being equivalent to the irrational. The numinous experience is of the character of knowledge, and knowledge is rational throughout. "Otto," says Dean Inge, "partly spoils a valuable argument by speaking repeatedly of this specifically religious consciousness as irrational." [3] The fundamental cry of religion must always be, says Canon Streeter in the same series of addresses, "Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us"; and to this, an answer that was once upon a time given is, "Have I been so long with you, and dost thou not know Me, Philip? He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." "He who penned this had travelled a long way from the 'mysterium tremendum fascinans' conception of religion." [4]

But, of course, it is evident that Otto is well aware of this. Indeed he emphatically declares

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 117.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 116.
[3] Address to Conference of Modern Churchmen, 1924.
[4] Essay on "Creative Prayer."

that this is the journey which religion has made from its first dawn in the human soul to the attainment of a faith in the Fatherhood of God, in that unsurpassable form in which it is peculiar to Christianity. This is the process of moralisation and rationalisation of the "numinous" shudder of the soul's experience before the "mysterium tremendum"—a natural and envitable process. But, according to Otto, in its highest and most perfect form, religious experience never loses possession of these features. Even Christian experience lays its warp of the rational and ethical across the woof of the non-rational numinous experience. When the rational factors are exaggerated we have Rationalism in its worst feature of arid theology and the sterile enlightenment of rationalistic eras; on the other hand, mysticism makes its appearance when the non-rational features of religious experience are overstressed "even to the point of one-sided exaggeration."[1] This is a useful definition to bear in mind, and sets forth important aspects of the character of religious experience in its various forms. But mysticism is not a foe to reason; it does not dwell in the region of the non-rational. Intellectualism is doubtless a serious danger to beset any religious system, and mysticism likewise may run to seed and lose itself in the futilities of a trivial pietism or an unenlightened fundamentalism. But Otto recognises that mysticism remains as a permanent factor in the life of religion. Christianity has a tendency

[1] Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 202; cp. note, p. 88.

towards mysticism, he maintains,[1] and therefore may be described as a type of religious experience "with a mystical colouring." "Since St Paul and St John, Christianity is not mysticism, but religion with a mystical colouring." This language is rather vague, though it agrees in principle with the view I have sought to maintain in these lectures.

Christian mysticism is rooted and grounded in the historic person of Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Son of God, and thereby is distinguished from all merely philosophical or theosophical mysticisms. But Christianity conceives that the soul is linked to its unseen Lord, the living Christ, by such an intimate and immediate intuition as the mystics of all ages have claimed as their treasure of great price. Our Christian faith lives intensely, and can continue so to live only when it has vividly and intimately apprehended the Christ.

This kind of experience is the presupposition and the groundwork of all our theologies and confessions. The mystics have brought to light the character of our organ of spiritual apprehension and the nature of the knowledge thus acquired. We cannot too insistently dwell upon these mystical aspects of our religious experience. By keeping them in view our theologies may be saved from unreality and thin-spun theorising; by striving after them the religious life of individuals and of churches will be guarded from coldness of heart and empty formalism. The fire of faith will then burn with a steady radiant

[1] Page 88, note.

light within us and around us. When the Christian theologian wanders away from the interpretation of the great classic intuitions of the Christian soul, he ends in the pit of barren scholasticism, mediæval or modern. Goethe defined mysticism as the " scholastic of the heart " ; and such definition carries us far if we interpret " heart " as the whole spiritual personality, actively and intensely striving after and obtaining this direct apprehension of and communion with God. Our theologies are the scholastic —the theoretical formulation and elucidation throughout the total range of their contacts with the rest of human experience, in science and philosophy and morality—of just such intuitions and insights as the Christian spirit attains in the presence of Christ.

That great teacher of the Church of Scotland, whose greatness with the passage of the years seems all the more incontrovertible, Principal John Caird, wrote in his ' Sermons ' these words : " Of all things good and fair and holy, there is a spiritual cognisance that precedes and is independent of that knowledge which the understanding conveys." Again, from the same sermon on " What is Religion," he writes : " There is an apprehension of God and divine things which comes upon the spirit as a living reality which it immediately and intuitively perceives." Let me remind you of Dean Inge's judgment of this volume of sermons, " that it contains the most powerful defence of what I have called Christian Mysticism that has appeared since William Law."

It is easy to understand when reading his earlier work, the 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion,' that Principal Caird is there engaged in fighting an intuitionalism as a theory of ethics and religion that had grown uncritical and worthless as a theory of knowledge. Under the influence of the great systematizer of the nineteenth century, Hegel, he sharply criticises this type of philosophical thought.[1] He is obviously concerned to point out that on such a view the door is open to all kinds of uncriticised "thoughts, sentiments or notions, and other unwarrantable popular assumptions," to enter consciousness claiming to possess absolute truth.[2] This is indeed a danger to be guarded against by all theologies and philosophies of religion, and especially by any one who attempts to justify the place and value of intuition in religious experience. Some so-called intuitions are nothing but startling apprehensions in a moment of swift insight, of truths already known—*e.g.*, of the nature of the Trinity—a doctrine whose validity is not guaranteed by intuition. It would be easy to multiply instances of this kind, of pseudo-intuitions which are really doctrines stated in conceptual or metaphysical terms. Other seeming intuitions are the result of reflection on experience, and have by no means been acquired at first hand in a moment of intuitive insight. But all these pseudo-intuitions can be discovered by the ordinary means of philosophical analysis and criticism, and their exact character

[1] *Op. cit.*, Chap. ii. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

laid bare. It is otherwise, however, with certain other fundamental insights and perceptions of the human spirit. They are not derived from experience, though they appear in experience—*e.g.*, the distinction between right and wrong, or the apprehension of the beautiful. These, it would seem, are in the true sense intuitions, not derivable from any other phase of experience. They are "data" or "fresh integrations" of human experience, with an unique quality and character of their own, disclosing a new field or phase of human experience. These perceptions are fundamental intuitions or insights of human experience. So too with the intuition of God. It likewise is an *a priori* element of human experience which cannot be resolved into other elements of a different order. Profound reflection may add richness and complexity to our intuition of God; but our apprehension of God is never merely the last term in a process of logical reasoning. The mystics make the immediate awareness of God to their souls the basal certainty of their being; and to them the perpetual source of wonder is that they have been privileged to share this knowledge and be made wise with this Divine wisdom. The primary intuition of religious experience is the intuition of God. Intuition deals with the fundamental spiritual realities, the self and God. Nothing is worthy of the name intuition which does not deal, though sometimes in a partial and elementary manner, with the real and the spiritual. By laying down this standard we are saved from

adopting as intuition what is only secondary and derivative.

As regards this knowledge and its attainment, the mystics claim that certain antecedent spiritual conditions must be fulfilled. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." Purification or purgation is the first step in the "via mystica"; without this as a preliminary there can be neither "illumination" nor a realisation of "union with God"—that is, no further progress on the mystics' "Ladder of Perfection." These *a priori* elements of our spiritual life come into prominence only under certain conditions, just as with the *a priori* condition of our knowledge of the external world. These elements or factors are discoverable only by those who persist in seeking for them.

The same contrast appears in other realms of human activity. There are certain natures capable of producing great works of musical art, the creators of our great music; while others as executants, or lovers of music, simply interpret and appreciate the creations of a master musician. Yet in order to accomplish this they must give themselves to the discipline and culture of their musical taste, a disciplinary preparation for the great art of musical interpretation. Otto uses this illustration of music, and then goes on to say: "*A priori* cognitions are not such as every one does have—such would be innate cognitions—but such as every one is capable of having." Such cognitions, he goes on to insist, are revealed only to natures specially endowed,

prophetic and mystic souls. As for others, they have a " predisposition " to grasp, apprehend, and delight in these intuitions and cognitions of the prophets and mystics when once they have been discovered and brought to light. " Most men have only the ' predisposition ' in the sense of a receptiveness and susceptibility to religion." [1] The prophetic minds, the creators in the spiritual realm, " divine " great spiritual certainties, intuitions, and cognitions, by which men of more limited faculty may live and be illumined spiritually ; and then in an impressive passage which concludes his volume, Otto writes : " Yet the prophet does not represent the highest stage. We can think of a third, yet higher, beyond him, a stage of revelation as underivable from that of the prophet as was his from that of common men. We can look beyond the prophet to One in whom is found the spirit in all its plenitude, and Who at the same time in His person and in His performance is become most completely the object of divination, in whom holiness is recognised apparent. Such an one is more than prophet. He is the Son." [2]

Now there are those who, according to the psychologists, are endowed with a religious temperament in marked contrast to those not so gifted. Such a temperament corresponds in its qualities to the analogous characteristics of a musical temperament, the peculiar endowment which marks the great musician, whether creative or interpretive. In the religious sphere likewise there are those of

[1] Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 181. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

a creative type, the spiritual geniuses of our race, and others whose intense vision of spiritual things marks them out as possessing an intuitive quality of soul. These are the spiritual pioneers of the race, men and women equipped in faculty and by discipline for this heroic task.

But apart from the possessors of such spiritual gifts, " nature's specially endowed," in Otto's words, the spirit of man in all ranges of its evolution has this predisposition towards a sense of the Beyond, of the Divine. The favourite text of the Cambridge Platonists was, " The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." [1] Religion is for them a life, based on the fundamental intuition of God. As Henry Scougal has it, and he, I believe, learned much from the Cambridge Platonists, " True religion is a union of the soul with God, a real participation of the divine nature, the very image of God, drawn upon the soul, or, in the apostle's phrase it is ' Christ formed within us.' " [2] Such a life, a divine life as Scougal calls it,—" so it may be called, not only in regard of its fountain and original, having God for its author and being wrought in the souls of men by the power of His Holy Spirit ; but also in regard of its nature, religion being a resemblance of the divine perfections, the image of the Almighty, shining in the soul of man " [3]—rests upon the basis of this intuition of God as its essential form ; while

[1] Proverbs xx. 27.
[2] ' The Life of God in the Soul of Man,' p. 41. Professor Cooper's edition,
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

the idea of God as the organising principle in theology is derived in the first resort from the immediately given intuition. But the "Idea" is not to be confounded with the "intuition," nor theology with religion. "Divinity," writes John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, "I shall call rather a divine life than a divine science." On the intuition of God the whole structure of religion is based.

The "idea" is to be considered as secondary to the "intuition"; and though it appears in a form clearer and more sharply defined, as do all products of intellectual activity, yet it is only imperfectly adequate to the richness and grandeur of the content of the intuition itself. And further, it is to be noted, it is the intuition that is directly and immediately in contact with the Divine Reality, while the idea is at one remove from it. In this sense, then, religion as "an elementary instinct and affirmation of Reality" is "unchangeably Metaphysical, Dogmatic; and if all Ontology is illusion, then all Religion is so likewise." [1] In God religion lives and moves and has its being. Without Him religion dissolves into illusion, and without the idea of God no philosophy of religion or theology can be articulated. "The religious experience is essentially an intuition and feeling of Reality as distinct from, as prior and subsequent to, as indefinitely more than, and as the cause of, the activities through which we apprehend it." [2] But, as

[1] Von Hügel, 'Eternal Life,' pp. 187-188.
[2] Von Hügel, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

in other cases, we must conceive of religion as a unity of experience, wherein may be revealed by analysis the intuition of God as the constitutive factor of that experience. It is a unity, because the intuitive and conceptual elements are closely interwoven and yet manifestly different. It is not necessary to affirm that this intuition is at all times present in the consciousness of finite spirits, but that it is manifest as the essentially creative factor in any experience which can indubitably be called religious. To deny this is to speak of something other than religion. Even religious experience of a pantheistic type is based on the fact of God, conceived as an Infinite Being, as it were, spatially diffused throughout the universe, and its character is constituted and determined by the conception of God thus understood. So, too, with religion of the Christian and Theistic type, though in this case the conception of God is different.

Analysis thus reveals this *a priori* intuitive factor in religious experience. This mode of apprehension of the Divine Life is brought to light most clearly in the life and experience of the mystic. It has been my endeavour to lay emphasis on this, and to bring into clear recognition the special features of this mode of apprehension. It reveals itself, I believe, in all types of religious experience and piety. Not only does the mystic, *par excellence*, the great classic Mystic, give proof of it in what he or she narrates of the history of their soul's life, but it finds a place also in the experience of

all faithful souls who have been stirred by such words as "Lo, I am with you alway, even to the end of the world," and have lived and worshipped, served and died, in that faith. Professor J. B. Pratt distinguishes between the milder and the more intense form of mystical experience, and thereby does a great service to the whole discussion of religious experience. An exaggerated importance has been put upon the study of abnormal forms of religious experience. It is, however, in milder forms that we can discover the universal elements in religious experience. The more intense forms simply reveal the working of what a psychologist would call a religious temperament—that is, a peculiar psycho-physical endowment. No true prayer of the ordinary pious soul is essentially different from the very mood and spirit of the prayers of the greatest mystics. At the heart of Protestantism there is a true and profound mysticism.

An ancient writer, Cassian,[1] has it, "a verse of a psalm may be the occasion of glowing prayer (contemplation) while we are singing." But devout souls to-day have, in the exercise of religious worship in our own churches, just such experiences, when all the soul's barriers are down and the spirit is engrossed in God. Who that has led the public worship of the House of God has not felt a flame of wonder, surprise, praise, and rapture? This undoubtedly is the mystic's mood. Such an experience awaits every believing heart when partaking of the

[1] See Butler, 'Western Mysticism,' p. 284.

communion of the "Broken Body." The mystic writers have many names for this experience. It is summed up, perhaps, best of all in the phrase "Contemplative Prayer." Such an experience is of infinite value for the devout spirits of men and women. It is not indeed easily attained, and consequently reacts profoundly upon the inner spirit. "In contemplation," says Ruysbroeck, "God comes to us without ceasing, and demands of us both action and fruition in such a way that the one never impedes but always strengthens the other. And, therefore, the most inward man lives his life in these two ways—namely, in work and in rest. And in each he is whole and undivided, and he is perpetually called by God to renew both the rest and the work." [1] The insistence upon the interaction between the active and the contemplative lives, action and fruition, denotes the essential sanity of the great mystic writers, and ought never to be forgotten. It saves the human spirit from two dangers—from a vapid and sterile emotionalism on the one hand; and, on the other, from a fussy practicality which lacks vision and the real spirit of Christian daring and heroic adventure.

I have no sympathy with the saying quoted by Otto, "that for a Protestant to love mysticism is mere dilettanteism: if he is in earnest, he must become a Catholic." [2] Otto himself rebuts it justly by saying, "'Mysticism' is an ambiguous term.

[1] 'The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage,' Book II., p. 65.
[2] *Op. cit.*, App. 6, p. 211.

If we mean by it the melting transport of a transcendent quasi-nuptial rapture, then the assertion may be justified. But the really typical 'moments' of mysticism—'creature-feeling' and 'union'—are not less but more possible upon the basis of Luther's 'Fides' (Faith as 'fiducia' and 'adhesio') than upon the basis of the 'amor mysticus.'"

The antipathy of many German writers—*e.g.*, Harnack and Herrmann—to mysticism, and their identification of it with Catholic piety, is to be in part explained, I believe, by the phenomenalism as regards knowledge which the Ritschlians inherited and adopted from Kant. If the links between the soul and Divine Reality are completely severed by the yawning chasm of the unknowable, then the essential plea of mysticism falls to the ground. The mystic bases everything on the sense of the Real Presence of the living God. This sense may be said to be an original endowment of the human spirit. It forms the foundation of all religion and the presupposition of any possible revelation of God to man. This is the way in which I should prefer to state it; but it is substantially the same as that which Dean Inge formulates as the second proposition on which mysticism rests. "Since we can only know what is akin to ourselves, man, in order to know God, must be a partaker of a divine nature."[1] This proposition is set forth in terms wide enough to include not only mysticism but also the basis of all idealistic philosophy from Plato to

[1] Inge, 'Christian Mysticism,' p. 6.

Hegel; but as such philosophical systems are very closely related to mysticism, such a definition makes manifest their unity in reference to the knowledge of Reality. To abandon this basis is equivalent to the assertion that "all mysticism is illusion." This is the position which the Ritschlians have reached. Mysticism is, according to them, Roman Catholic piety, to which, apart from recalling Luther's saying concerning the mystical treatise, 'Theologia Germanica,' that "next to the Bible and St Augustine no book hath ever come into my hands whence I have learned . . . more of what God and Christ and man and all things are," one may reply that the whole Protestant movement is rooted in mysticism.

Professor Rufus Jones in his volume 'The Spiritual Reformers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries' amply proves this, as indeed does any extended study of the mystical tendencies which have appeared in the history of the great world religions. There are certain "false and sickly" aspects of Roman Catholic mysticism which will never make any appeal to piety of a more virile type. Some of it shows pure aberration and abnormality. But, on the other hand, it may be said that all rebirths of religion, whether Catholic or Protestant, begin with some overwhelming mystical experience, and that religion in any stage of the Church's existence is saved from sterility and formalism, from rationalism and institutionalism, just by the savour and zest of the mystical element

in religion. Royce long ago insisted in his Gifford Lectures that "the mystics were thoroughgoing empiricists"—that is, they go back directly to the roots of religion in the soul, to the spirit's sense of individual inspiration, to drink from—

> The bubblings of the springs
> That feed the world.

They are the children of God, begotten by the Holy Spirit. Their appearance gives a new life to a dead Church, as did St Francis in Italy, as did Luther in Germany. So revolutionary do they seem in some instances that the traditionalists, whether in the thirteenth century Italy of St Francis or in the eighteenth century England of John Wesley, are faced with a grave difficulty in dealing with them. The Church of Rome did wisely to enlist the poor man of Assisi with his mighty passion for God in the service of evangelising the world of men and ministering to its needs. On the other hand, probably no one to-day will hesitate to say that the Church of England blundered gravely when it drove John Wesley to organise a religious society independent of it. It was as grave a loss for the Church as was the secession of the American colonies for the State.

The mystics have often been children of the storm and heralds of revolt, among whom a characteristic figure is that of St Paul. But the greatest of them, like St Paul or St Francis, have found themselves braced and supported by the great Christian tradi-

tions and by the corporate life of the Church. Mere individualism in religion often ends in the futilities and vagaries of Prophetism and other bizarre spiritualisms, forgetting the better way of St Paul.[1] After all, the Holy Spirit is the spirit of truth, and they who follow its leadings must keep in touch with the truth He has already given to the Church and to the mind of man. In Hegelian phraseology the particular needs the life of the universal. The man of science makes advances in knowledge by fresh discovery on the basis of the work of his predecessors. The great musicians begin their work as pupils of the older masters, and push out gradually to new developments in their divine art. The mystic spirit likewise needs the strong culture of the religious tradition in which it is born to enable it to add fresh light and colour to the things already spoken to the Church by the Spirit of God. It lives in the bond of peace through the unity and continuity of the working of the Holy Spirit. It may be true, as Von Hügel says, that " the higher and highest Mystical attitude has never ceased to find its fullest, most penetrating, expression in the life and teaching of the devoted children of the Roman Church," [2] because what is generally known as the Roman Church has a longer history than other Christian communities, and because the Roman Church has always provided abundant opportunities for the pursuit of the " Life of Medita-

[1] 1 Corinthians xii. 31.
[2] ' Mystical Element of Religion,' p. 305.

tion." But Protestantism is founded upon the fact of the mystical attitude as expressing the deepest and most fundamental attitude of the soul towards God. If not "articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae," at least it embodies the very article of the soul's knowledge of God, its nerve and tissue, its germ and life process.[1]

[1] When speaking of the doctrine of justification by faith, as held by the Reformers, Professor Wheeler Robinson declares that "the primary emphasis of that mystical religion from which the principle of the Reformation sprang was precisely that of the complete surrender of the whole personality to God in Christ" ('The Christian Doctrine of Man,' p. 218). Then the writer quotes a well-known passage from the 'Theologia Germanica' (Chap. x.) thus: "Where men are enlightened with the true light . . . they renounce all desire and choice and commit and commend themselves and all things to the Eternal Goodness. Nevertheless, there remaineth in them a desire to go forward and get nearer to the Eternal Goodness—that is, to come to a clearer knowledge and a warmer love, a more comfortable assurance, and perfect obedience and subjection—so that every enlightened man could say, 'I would fain be to the Eternal Goodness what his own hand is to a man.'"

LECTURE IV.

CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM AND THEOLOGY

CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM AND THEOLOGY.

Mysticism thus points to the fount of the soul's life, the energising centre of its life in God, and the growing point of its knowledge. According to the usual terminology of Protestant thinkers, it is faith which is the " sine qua non " of religious experience. Without entering into an historical discussion of the term faith as used in Reformation times, it is true to say that the term for the Reformers implied an active trust of the soul, in particular of the will in the personal, historic, revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It lays stress on the moral rather than on the intellectual side of the primary act of the soul's faith, though it involved them both. Dr Rufus M. Jones, in describing this method of approach " to a religion for mature minds," writes thus : [1] " By faith I mean the soul's moral or appreciative apprehension of God as historically revealed, particularly as revealed in the personal life of Jesus Christ. This faith-way to God cannot be wholly separated except by an artificial abstraction from the inward way of mysticism." [2] Faith in this sense is the active

[1] 'Spiritual Reformers,' Preface, p. xxxix.

[2] Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 107 : " 'Faith' for Luther plays the same essential part *mutatis mutandis* as 'knowledge' and 'love' for the

response of the soul to the personal revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It is the human response to the Divine revelation, Incarnate in the Person of Jesus Christ. To many minds mysticism may seem to ignore this necessary aspect of Christian experience which the conception of faith thus interpreted brings to light: on the Divine side as a Divine Act and Fact God's revealed presence in Jesus Christ, and on the human side the utter moral acceptance in faith of this most wondrous gift and self-donation.

This probably lies at the basis of the objection raised to mysticism by men of the school of Luther, such as Harnack and Herrmann. It is needful to bear their criticism in mind. Mysticism which degenerates into a sentimental transport of emotion is an entirely unworthy and incomplete expression of the soul's contact with and assent to God. But contact of the soul with God touches the heart with flame, and it likewise enlightens the understanding and becomes the prime motive of the will. The conception of God's active and creative part in the life of religion has, as its counterpart in man, his active assent to and trust in the historic Person who is God's revelation. In the words of the Fourth Gospel, (1) "the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us full of grace and truth"; [1] and (2) "as many as received Him to them gave He power to

earlier mystics. It is the unique power of God, the 'adhaesio Dei,' which unites man with God; and 'unity' is the very signature of the mystical."

[1] St John i. 14.

become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His name." [1] These are the two corresponding sides of the whole life of religion, its Godward and manward side as seen in this " spiritual gospel " of the Incarnation of the Son of Man.

But for man this apprehension affects his whole personality, and is manifested there. Mysticism, doubtless in some of its forms, exaggerates the merely intellectual side of this relationship. But it is not so in this " mystical Gospel " of our Christian faith. The doctrine of faith in the Fourth Gospel is more fully developed and more profound than in the three Synoptic Gospels. Faith for the synoptists is that quality of spirit without which the works of Christ cannot be accomplished. A characteristic saying is that concerning Nazareth, where it is recorded that " Jesus did not many mighty works there because of their unbelief," [2] whereas, whenever faith is present and manifest, even mountains can be removed. But in the Johannine literature, where there occurs the frequent phrase πιστεύειν εἰς, we have expressed that dedicatory attitude of the whole personality towards Christ which, for this writer, is the basis of all things. " These things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through His name." [3]

[1] St John i. 12.
[2] St Matthew xiii. 58 ; cp. St Mark vi. 6.
[3] St John xx. 31.

On the basis of such belief the whole structure of religious experience, according to this Gospel, is built. As the primary demand there is requisite this unique attitude of the human soul towards Him Who is the Only-Begotten Son of God. Faith precedes knowledge. " Faith begins with an experiment and ends with an experience." [1] But it is an experiment which involves the whole personality, feeling, intellect, and will. It signifies a complete self-dedication, and this is just what the true mystic always asserts.

I take it that the soul of Christian mysticism, in face of the historic Christ, is set forth for all time in classical form in this Gospel according to St John. According to Otto,[2] " Christianity is a religion with a mystical colouring," and has been so since St Paul and St John: a statement which, while pointing to the truth, yet does less than justice to the mystical element in religious experience. The outlines of religion are not, first of all, as this phrase of Otto's would seem to imply, etched in firm intellectual draughtsmanship and then tinted with colours to give charm and naturalness. If this phrase of Otto's implies any such order of procedure in the structure of religion, then it is unsatisfactory. Mystical insight is far more deeply embedded in the structure of the religious experience of mankind than this would imply. What Professor J. A. Stewart, in his Introduction to his volume on the Myths of

[1] Inge, ' Christian Mysticism,' p. 50.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 88, note.

Plato, describes as " The Transcendental Consciousness," seems to me to lay bare something that is fundamental, the very nature and essence of religion.

The fundamental intuition of the mystic is that of God. It is later developed by the labour of thought so that there emerges the Idea of God, and it is further enriched by being brought into contact with other ranges of human experience, science, art, and philosophy. Religion itself is not to be identified with any one of these, but is an entirely independent, self-developing, self-integrating approach to the Divine. Religion never becomes a mere philosophy, but uses philosophical ideas to define its attitude to the questions which philosophy raises in conformity with the Christian spirit and intuition of God. " Religion," Hegel wrote,[1] " is reason thinking naïvely " ; but whether it thinks naïvely (as it does in its early forms) or with deeper reflection (as in its maturer forms), the range of its thoughts is always *within* the terms of the life of religion—the soul and God and the personal relationship of communion between them. Philosophy is not, as Hegel maintained, the truth of religion, or religion in a truer or more exact form, as if religion were thereby superseded. The approach of philosophy to Reality is essentially different from that of religion, and the latter can never be " transmuted " or transformed into the former without losing its character. The mystics help us to keep this quality and character of religion in mind. It

[1] Cp. Pringle-Pattison, ' Philosophical Radicals,' p. 280.

is the experience of a personal relationship between the soul and God, and the Philosophy of the Christian Religion is the further elucidation, interpretation, and enlargement of this experience by the work of reason. But this work of thought, as Theology or Philosophy, can never replace in the soul as an adequate substitute the Experience and Realisation of the soul's life in God. It may be that " Das Denken ist auch Gottesdienst," in Hegel's famous phrase to the landlady who reproached him with non-attendance at church, in the sense at least that all the great activities of the human soul, creative work of all kinds in art, science, and philosophy, are truly services of God, as they are sublime operations of the human soul. But none of them are substitutes for religion. In a vague sense a man may call his art his religion, or his quest of truth in some department of human knowledge, his " religion " as expressing his whole-hearted devotion to such pursuits. But this is only a limited, secondary, and weakened sense of the term. There is no substitute whatever in any other part of human experience for the essentially unique life of religion, nor can religion be considered merely as an imperfect inaccurate form of philosophy, mere " picture-thinking." Of this truth the devout of all ages are a standing witness. The group of great mystics throughout the ages gives further startling evidence of this. Neither students of Religion nor of Theology should lose sight of it.

The whole argument of these lectures points to

this conclusion. Mystical experience appears as an "emergent" factor in the history of all the great religions, and especially during their most creative periods. It is certainly not peculiar to Christianity, but in its Christian form bears the marks of the soul's contact with the creative mind of Christ. The stages and developing phases of mysticism are fully dealt with in the many important volumes on Christian Mysticism which have made their appearance during the last thirty years in England and elsewhere, to which every student of this subject stands permanently indebted. "Our consciousness of the Beyond is," writes Dean Inge in defining Mysticism,[1] "the raw material of all religions. It is part of our nature as human beings." While later he adds: "The Gospel of St John . . . is the charter of Christian mysticism. Indeed, Christian mysticism, as I understand it, might almost be called Johannine Christianity."[2] Again, some nine years later, comes the fuller, and as always with Von Hügel, the more intricately worded definition in his 'Mystical Element of Religion.[3] "The faculty and action of the soul by which we have an, however dim, yet direct and (in its general effects) immensely potent sense and feeling, an immediate experience of Objective Reality, of the Infinite and Abiding, of a Spirit not all unlike, yet distinct from, our own, which penetrates and works within these our finite spirits, and in the world at large, especially in

[1] 'Christian Mysticism,' p. 5. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 44.
[3] Vol. ii., p. 390.

human history . . . is met by the Mystical and the directly Operative element of religion." The attitude of the present lectures has already been defined in relation to other writers sympathetic or otherwise, but probably owes most to the two authors from whom I have just quoted. They write as devoted adherents of the ecclesiastical system to which they belong; both are touched with the spirit of Modernism, and both know the Christian faith from within as an all-engrossing fact and certainty in their lives.

The mystic spirit of man in its reawakening with the birth of Christianity found that the intuition of God was now qualified by the personality of Jesus Christ as the unique mediator and revelation of God. Through Him they reach the Ultimate Life of the world, and it is characteristic of Mysticism, Christian or otherwise, that that is the aim of its quest. It cannot be satisfied with anything short of this, and so the Christian mystic says with St Paul: "It was God who was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." [1] And it was the heavenly Christ who, for the Christian mystic, became the object of his intuition, faith, and love. "We beheld (ἐθεασάμεθα) His glory, the glory as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." [2] The eternal mystic need is there, but it has taken on the impress of Christ, conceived both as Messiah and as Logos, the creative word of God. Both of these conceptions, the Jewish Messiah and the

[1] 2 Cor. v. 19. [2] John i. 14.

Greek Logos, by their own inherent logic drive the mind back to God, the Supreme and Ultimate Life of the world.

Christian mysticism is linked to the spirit of mysticism, wherever it appears in human life, in association with various religions. All types of mysticism have the same psychological antecedents in the human soul. They all seek the Ultimate Life of God, and rejoice in an immediate sense of His Presence. But Christian mysticism approaches that Ultimate Life through an historic Life in whom it finds God. Its intuition of God is qualified by its faith in Jesus Christ. In the light of the prologue of the Fourth Gospel we cannot doubt that the intuition of God remained the ultimate fact in experience for this great exponent of the Christian faith, the author of the Gospel. "In Him was life, and the Life was the Light of men." [1] But belief in Christ appears as a decisive fact on the human side, qualifying and enriching this fundamental intuition. John the Baptist came to aid men to attain this belief.[2] Intuition and belief are conceived as co-operant factors in the Johannine interpretation of the religious consciousness of the Christian believer. This additional factor of belief in an historic person, as bound up with fundamental religious intuition of God, is summarily expressed in the words: "The Logos became flesh and tabernacled among us and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace

[1] John i. 4. [2] John i. 7.

and truth." [1] This is indeed a new "integration" (to use the psychologist's term) of religious experience. Two elements of our Christian experience are here united which cannot be separated without the overthrow and destruction of that experience. Here we have "intuition" qualified by "belief or faith," resulting in a new intuition which remains for ever, a marked characteristic of Christian experience.

Intuition is thus enriched by a new fact, the Historic Person Jesus Christ, and by a new human attitude towards that fact—namely, faith in Him. The co-operating factors here, as always in the religious sphere, are God and man: on the one side, God revealing Himself; and on the other, man apprehending that revelation in an act of entire self-consecration which we denominate faith or belief. There is much in St Paul which corresponds to this position I have outlined, but it seems to me that it is most explicitly stated in the Gospel of St John. In reading St Paul's letters one is inclined to think with the hymn writer that the voice of the historic Christ comes "faint and far," but it is never so with the Fourth Gospel. The Christ of the Fourth Gospel is no mere "heavenly man," but one who in the midst of earthly life touches and moulds the spirits of men in all emergencies and needs, in the marriage at Cana as by the grave of Lazarus. "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." [2] The Christ of the Fourth Gospel may

[1] John i. 14. [2] John x. 10.

speak in terms and phrase that contrast sharply with the Jesus of the synoptics, but nowhere is He represented as being so immersed in human life and in commerce with human beings amid all the varieties of their life's phases, social and intellectual, moral and religious, as in the Fourth Gospel. He may not be in Tyrell's phrase "the strange man on the Cross," but we understand from these pages, as nowhere else, how He, "the lowly servant of human souls," reached, touched, and conquered every phase of human life, the social and the practical, as well as sin, sorrow, and death. He has become the Divine Companion, the Saviour of the world, the Object of faith, the Bread of Life; and who shall deny that here we find, as caught and reflected in man's attitude of faith towards him, the very Truth of His Being?

From the beginning of the Gospel the perfect attitude of faith is already established, so that without any incongruity the Baptist may at once hail Him as "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." [1] It is always from the point of view of faith that He comes "en rapport" with men. His words are spirit and life. To the enquiring Nicodemus He enunciates [2] that most profound of Gospel sayings: "God so loved the world that He gave His Only-Begotten Son that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish but have everlasting Life," as if Nicodemus were at one leap by a sudden rebirth of soul able to appre-

[1] John i. 29. [2] John iii. 16.

ciate the innermost secret of Christian faith. Though Jesus in this Gospel appears now and again as an Unknown Figure—*e.g.*, as in the conversation with the woman of Samaria, yet it is as the Christ of the Church's faith, the centre and inspirer of its life, not as the prophet of the Kingdom of God, that He speaks to her. And it is indeed truly in the spirit of mysticism that as an unknown voice and authority He first of all makes His Presence felt, offering the gift of the water of life. The Great Unknown becomes in the end "Rabboni," "my Master," [1] and always acts as the Giver of God's most divine gifts. He speaks as the Creator of love in the Christian soul, the Object towards which such love is directed. His self-consciousness as here expressed reflects the already attained experience of His Work and Worth by the Christian Church. Dean Inge says: "The writer of the Fourth Gospel thus allows the experience of the Christian Church to throw light upon the Gospel history, instead of making the historical records bear the whole weight of the Church's faith." [2]

History is here mingled in a truly impressive way with the intuitions and certainties of faith, so that in this record of His life the enquiring heart finds answers to its questions out of the depths of Christian experience. History and faith are here for the Christian spirit inextricably woven together as warp and woof. History from this standpoint is not

[1] Cp. John xx. 16.
[2] 'Personal Idealism and Mysticism,' p. 62.

merely the record of events as occurring in the passage of time. It is rather a record of the Church's growth in love and knowledge and faith under the impact of the spirit of Christ. Time becomes subservient to the needs and demands of the spirit of faith, begotten by Christ in the hearts of His people. The experiences of the Christian heart as coming to birth in those momentous days are centred in Him, of Whose life a record might be written according to the standards of chronology or clock-time, but Whose whole attitude to life is made manifest in great creative moments, here recorded; and these, after all, are counted to be the substance and essence of it.

Yet in some places it must be confessed this Gospel appears "thin and abstract" in its historical approach when compared with the synoptics, "as compared," writes Von Hügel, "with the inexhaustible richness and spontaneity actually lived and proposed to us by Jesus Himself. In the Synoptists, Jesus 'grows in favour with God and man'; passes through a profoundly real individual experience in His Baptism and Temptation; prays alone on the mountain side; suffers an agony of fear, and seeks His disciples' sympathy in Gethsemane; and dies with a cry of desolation upon Calvary. In the Fourth Gospel the Logos' watchword is 'I *am*'; there is no Baptism and no Temptation. He has deliberately to stir up emotion in Himself. He prays only for others, and in the Garden and on the Cross He shows naught but self-possession." [1]

[1] 'Eternal Life,' p. 79.

The early period of the Christian Church was characterised by many writers of speculative but unhistoric temper, whom we commonly designate as Gnostics. It has often been pointed out how frequently in the Johannine literature the term γινώσκειν appears — twenty-five times in the first Epistle. This fact may indicate the kind of intellectual atmosphere of which the writer was aware in his contemporaries, as well as mark his sense of the danger of intellectualism—in short, of Gnosticism for the Christian Church. He carefully avoids the term γνῶσις ; and he is marked off from all the Gnostics by his regard for historical truth.

Mysticism and true religion in all ages have two foes : on the one side Moralism, and on the other Intellectualism. In itself it is a vigorous protest against these one-sided developments of religious experience. In the early Christian Church the moralism against which Christianity fought was represented by Judaism ; while Gnosticism was the phase which Intellectualism took in the first Christian centuries. The whole structure and plan of the Fourth Gospel seems to me to be designed in order to combat these tendencies. No point of view can more satisfactorily accomplish this twofold purpose than can that of this " charter of Christian Mysticism " (Dean Inge), the mystical approach to the Christian faith as embodied in the Fourth Gospel. Nearer our own day the same tendencies again made their appearance : Kant, with his moralistic interpretation of Christianity ; and Hegel, with the

" speculative " interpretation of Christian doctrine. Both these great thinkers minimise the mystical element in religion as well as the worth of the historical facts which are bound up with the Christian religion as regards the historic Jesus.

Religion appears in its higher forms as an intense apprehension or intuition of God as a living factor in the lives of men; and that apprehension is not to be confounded either with the judgments and principles of ethics (though ethics and religion are closely linked together) nor with the abstract intellectual statement of a philosophic conception of God. It is this witness as to the real character of Religion that Mysticism brings to light; it was that quality of it which I ventured to speak of as its main contribution not only to Religion but to Theology. This apprehension of God is the primary fact in the life of religion, and this is a position in substantial accordance with the life and teaching of the mystics. " The cruel riddles of the world, with their obstinate questions, may stir the disquiet of the soul to which religion finally brings its answer; but the root of religion in the soul is the awakened sense of God." [1] That sense of God in the soul may prelude its coming " by a consciousness of present sin and misery," [2] but a consciousness of sin is not to be dissevered from a latent or implicit sense of God, as the primary fact in the life of religion. The mystics declare that the state of illumination

[1] Pringle-Pattison, ' The Philosophical Radicals,' p. 259.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 259.

precedes the stage of purgation, or that the sense of God is the essential fact in the growth of religion and in the awakening of a consciousness of sin in the human soul. The root of religion is indeed the consciousness of God, for only "in His light do we see Light," and only in His light are we conscious of the darkness into which sin plunges our souls. God is thus the central fact and witness round which centres the whole of our religious life, and from which it takes its many-coloured hues—the confession of sin, the sense of atonement as a fact in the life of God and man, God's Will to reconcile, and man's cry for deliverance from estrangement from Him Who is at once Holiness and Love. Religion is a sphere of human experience where the saying, "It is by eternal principles or truths that the mind is influenced," [1] does not satisfactorily state the truth. Truth in the abstract doubtless moulds and determines the life and actions of men, especially in regard to ethical problems; but with religion it is otherwise. The basis and structure of the religious life is not that of principles, ethical or intellectual, but consists in personal relationships between the soul and God. The mystics warn us that the life of religion is destroyed if we pass beyond these relationships. The religious life never does, if it remains true to itself. It has had to meet and to fight ethical legalism as it has in various forms raised its head against the life of religion. It was

[1] Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

this error that St Paul had so stubbornly to contest, as the Epistle to the Galatians bears witness: "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law but by faith in Jesus Christ." [1] But it is immediately after he has laid down this principle that he gives utterance to the greatest of his mystical sayings, laying bare the roots of religion in the Christian soul: "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me." [2]

How intricately mystical experience is here woven together with history, especially the history of the Passion and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. History, for the experience of the Christian, is not merely "the vehicle of certain truths," [3] as if history sheds truths as an oak-tree its leaves. It is a unique creation; because in the time-series of events we may discover the expression of those unique spiritual forces which we know as personalities. Every event of the life of Christ becomes significant, not of general truth but of the spirit and impulse of the Life of which they form a part. Here time is the vehicle of the Life Spirit of Jesus the Son of God. The temporal series is expressive of a life-purpose coherent as are all great life-purposes, but likewise creative in a unique manner; and it is towards this unique series of events that Christian faith looks, and with

[1] Gal. ii. 16. [2] Gal. ii. 20. [3] Pringle-Pattison, p. 284.

which it links its "endeavour after God." "By any event," writes Pringle-Pattison in the same passage, again interpreting Hegel,[1] "the divine purpose must be inadequately represented or set forth." Give us, the cry seems to be, the law or principle of the central figure of the Gospel, and that will suffice us. "Die to live" emerges as its central principle or kernel. The rest is but husk, the outward trappings of this golden maxim. Let us retain and live by this eternal principle.

But this procedure results in the devitalising of the gospel-history and in its de-personalisation. St Paul's cry is, "*I* have been crucified with *Christ*"; and therein we may read all the colour and passion and mystical devotion of the apostle's spirit to his Lord. It is not because St Paul has reduced that Life to a general principle which he now follows in his daily living that he retains his loyalty to Christ. "Christ liveth in me," not as an abstract maxim, however exalted and divine, but as a Living Presence whose spirit is manifest in the pages of history; and that attitude for ever puts St Paul among the great mystics. If St Paul is to be accounted as among the great mystics, the emphasis of his thought in this respect should keep us from falling a prey to a false and abstract mysticism. Christian mysticism has its roots in its attachment to the historic Christ as the Creative and Redemptive Centre of its being. In Him it lives and moves and has its

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 284.

being. Apart from this primary attachment, it incurs the danger of becoming a theosophy, living on metaphysical principles or on ethical legalism with its bundle of maxims. From either of these mistaken and one-sided forms of spiritual life we are saved by bearing in mind the witness of the Christian mystics, or, better still, of submitting ourselves with the same devotion and spiritual *élan* to the Master of their life, Jesus Christ. "To me to live is Christ." The mystics all maintain that the crown of their experience is the "Unitive" life, which is not to be understood in the sense of absorption.

"But for the testimony of the great cloud of witnesses," says the Dean of St Paul's in his 'Confessio Fidei,'[1] "who have mounted higher and seen more, I should not have ventured to build so much on this immediate revelation of God to the human soul. But the evidence of the saints seems to me to be absolutely trustworthy. . . . Do we know of any who have sought after the knowledge of God as diligently as other men seek after wealth and honour, and have come away empty-handed?"

This linkage of Christian mystical experience with events and happenings is due, as I have said, to the sense of the utter uniqueness of the life of Christ. As the faithful soul is bound to Him by the ties of mystic communion, so, too, the whole of His Life and Action, including His Death and Resurrection,

1 'Outspoken Essays,' Vol. ii. p. 15.

attains the value and significance of a Divine and Absolute fact. On this basis the doctrine of the Incarnation is built up—a doctrine which brings into relationship the Transcendent Life of God with the historic happenings of the life of Jesus Christ. Here the Gospel history is considered deeply significant as expressing the nature and character of God, and the eternal world finds its image or expression in the finite and temporal. "Religion absolutely requires," writes Von Hügel, "at every stage *Ontology*, a really extant God, and really *happened* Historical Facts and Persons. Indeed, Christianity's greatness resides especially in its all-pervasive and persistent Incarnational trend; since God, the Eternal Spirit, here reveals Himself to us and touches us in Duration and through Matter." [1]

St Augustine, the student and disciple of the Neo-Platonists, narrates how Christianity and Platonism touched each other in their fundamental philosophies, yet Christianity was marked by special features. "That the word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us," he writes in his 'Confessions,' [2] "I did not find in the books of Platonists." This is a clearly marked line of cleavage, and marks off Christianity as a religion from all theosophies and speculative idealisms. It also shows how closely the experience of the Christian Mystics must necessarily be interwoven with the events of the historic Jesus, whom the Fourth Gospel declares to be "The way, the truth, and the life," if, indeed, it is to be true to Him by Whom it lives.

[1] 'Eternal Life,' p. 342. [2] 'Conf.,' vii. 9.

Certain other questions still remain to be briefly dealt with :—

1. The mystical element in religion in its relationship to the other factors involved.
2. The individual mystic in his place in that great society, the Church of Christ.

Not even the mystic has maintained that the religious life consists only in inner experience. Some of them doubtless have been suspicious of sacramental worship, if not hostile to it. Thus Sebastian Franck, an interesting figure in Reformation times, declared: "The kingdom of God is neither prince nor peasant, food nor drink, hat nor coat, here nor there, yesterday nor to-morrow, baptism nor circumcision, nor anything whatever that is external, but peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, unalloyed love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience and an unfeigned faith." [1]

The Society of Friends is a religious Society organised for worship without either the sacrament of Baptism or Holy Communion. The inner way for them is sufficient, with its periods of silent worship, completely under the sway of the Holy Spirit. But the main tradition of Christian worship has never acquiesced in this negative attitude towards the sacraments. They are its most treasured means of grace—whether they be counted seven

[1] Paradox, Sec. 45, see Rufus M. Jones, 'Spiritual Reformers in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,' p. 59.

with the Greek orthodox and the Roman churches or two according to the standards of Scripture. The Scottish Church has been continuously of this belief and practice, and has seen to it that the sacraments have been duly administered within her borders. As man is both soul and body of a two-fold nature, the body an organ of the inner life of the spirit of man, so we take it that the "life of God in the soul of man" requires outward forms of expression in the sacraments as well as in a dignified house of God for the meeting together of the people of God. "Outward and inward" correspond through every region of human experience; so that for the worship of the "King in His Beauty" it is little wonder that all the great arts and crafts have been called into the service, and for the adornment, of the Churches of Christendom. The tendency in our own country to recognise more clearly than ever these two aspects of Christian worship is only in conformity with this principle. True mysticism is not the religion of the solitary. It finds its finest flowering in the hearts of men and women within the life of the Church.

A mystic experience within the soul is a true preparation for corporate worship. Christian worship, like Christian Theology, centres in Christ. "Christ liveth in me," says St Paul in the vein of the true mystic; hence the soul is "in Christ" as the great environing Life of its being, the Air it breathes, the Source of all its life, freedom, joy, and salvation, the Object of its worship and adoration.

For the most part the mystics have remained associated with the great historic Churches of Christendom. They have loved the sacraments of the Church, and brought to the altars of God the devotion of their God-filled spirits. To my mind the mysticism of our Scottish race appears in a very impressive way during the great sacramental services of the Church, when the gates of the soul are opened. There is a delightful section on this subject in Professor H. M. B. Reid's Croall Lectures on the "Holy Spirit and the Mystics"; but I am sure, as he suggests, the subject could be dealt with more fully and to good purpose.

Here again the mystic shows us the way and guards us against allowing the "communion of the Body and Blood of Christ" to become a mere "outward" observance. It is for them a supreme moment of their lives. It is a symbol of the highest stage of the "scala perfectionis," that of the unitive life. Here knowledge is merged in love; and on this note of Love there has grown up a rich vocabulary of phrase and metaphor in the endeavour to express the wonder and intimacy of that union of the disciple and his Lord. Some of these phrases may seem exaggerated—even repugnant,—but they are all attempts to explain an experience which passes the power of ordinary counters and categories of thought to express. The world's greatest love poetry will seem a pale reflection of what the soul desires to say of the Divine Lover. "This monk can give lessons to lovers!" exclaimed Arthur

Symons in astonishment, of St John of the Cross. [1]

The mystic enters into this great moment of worship and communion as one who finds that every element of his nature is satisfied—his reason, his devotion, his imagination, and his sentiment of love. Here there is a transmutation of all those emotions which have their part in human love, so that they may be fitter vehicles of the Emotion of God—if I may use the phrase. As reason becomes a more delicate and sensitive organ of apprehension in the form of Intuition, so here, too, our emotions become attuned to the subtler harmonies and movements of the Divine Spirit, and grow increasingly sensitive to His Presence. Apart from the mystic mood and spirit, the greatest significance of our sacramental observances cannot be caught. I am not here speaking merely, as I have refrained from doing so throughout, of those called the "great mystics" or those temperamentally of the mystic type, but of all devout souls who find joy in partaking of that Feast which, despite its many forms and theoretical explications, is yet the common possession of all Christendom. It is probably true to say that too much stress has been laid by psychologists on the extreme forms of mystical experience, their trances and ecstasies, with their seeming aberrations, from what might roughly be called the "normal." Rather should we consider the Mystical Element in Religion as so essential to

[1] Evelyn Underhill, 'Mysticism,' p. 107.

the life of religion that it makes its appearance in any genuine religious experience. "The mystics," writes Royce in his Gifford Lectures, "have been the spiritual counsellors of humanity."

The mystic seeks after that all-round development of the religious spirit which, as in the rest of our spiritual growth, is most to be desired. With him religion is not merely a doctrine to which he has given assent, not an ethical code which he attempts to put into practice, but a life lived in communion with God, based on the living immediate sense of His presence in the soul. Nor does mysticism result simply in the pursuit of the meditative life. It finds full and free outlet and expression in a life of action. Of St Ignatius Loyola, William James writes: "He was a mystic, but his mysticism made him assuredly one of the most powerfully practical human engines that ever lived." [1] The true mystic is always a practical mystic, even though he be not a Cromwell and a man of affairs.

Likewise the mystic is by no means averse to the pursuit of truth and to the felt need in any great organised religion like Christianity, of doctrine and dogma and theoretical formulation. Having known what St John of the Cross called "the touch of God in the soul," he is desirous of reaching out till he can relate in thought this life-giving experience with the other insights and teachings of the Christian Church. The much-abused theologian is not really without the Divine spark of the mystic's insight and

1 'Varieties of Religious Experience,' p. 413.

love in his heart; whence otherwise is the passion to defend, protect, and interpret the great beliefs and experiences of the Christian life to which he gives his life? I have already referred to John Caird in this regard; it is true of a host of others, including many of our own generation. The religious history of St Augustine bears evidence of it also. It is even permissible to say that the master-theologian of the Reformation, John Calvin, apprehended the "sovereignty of God," his fundamental religious intuition, with something like mystic fervour. Professor Eugène Choisy of Geneva says: "At the centre of the religious experience of Calvin there is not the person and cross of Christ as with Luther, but there is the sovereign action of God, Who illumines by His Word, reveals Himself as Redeemer in Jesus Christ, and Who vivifies and regenerates the heart by the Holy Spirit." And of the "sudden conversion of Calvin" he writes: "This is the moment when this 'intellectual conviction' became the conviction of the heart, a personal living experience, a truth sealed in the depths of his being by the Holy Spirit." [1]

"These men," wrote Tauler, "enjoyed an enlightened understanding." The mystic, doubtless, in many cases is far from being a trained theologian; but there is evidence, I think, for declaring that no great soul-shaking overwhelming experience, such as that of the mystics, can occur without causing profound reverberation in all phases of the spiritual

[1] E. Choisy, 'Calvin, Educateur des consciences,' pp. 22, 23.

life, and in the life of intellect no less than in others. It may become the prime motive of a man's whole intellectual life as well as the foundation of his religious life. Dr Reid does well to connect together "The Holy Spirit and the Mystics," for there we have the heart of the matter. "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" says St Paul;[1] but the Holy Spirit as the "Leader into all truth" completes his work in the soul by linking the soul's present insight and intuition of Divine Reality with the great traditional teachings of the Church. There are, indeed, many mystics who by the passion of their vision have severed themselves from the Historic Churches, or have been driven out by these Churches as troublesome and wilful children; but in too many cases such isolation from the main streams of Christian thought and inspiration has resulted in a certain barrenness and futility of thought, and a one-sidedness of religious development. That is evident while reading such a volume as that of Professor Rufus M. Jones on 'Spiritual Reformers in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.' The life of the Church, with its background of religious teaching and doctrine, has a fructifying and inspiring influence in the religious development of the Christian believer. The Holy Spirit teaches us also through these; and those who heedlessly pass them by without attempting to sound their depths are liable to suffer from spiritual

[1] 1 Cor. iii. 16

confusion and unfruitfulness. There are some varieties of religious experience which promise well, but really prove sterile. They are branches of the Vine of Life that ultimately are lopped off as dead and useless, or wither away as branches that suffer from insufficient nourishment.

This department of the subject has been fully handled by the late Professor H. M. B. Reid in his volume 'The Holy Spirit and Mystics.' "Jesus Himself," he declares, "is the first Christian mystic,"[1] a statement with which I fully agree; though it is important to notice how Christian mysticism in its later forms focuses itself upon Christ Himself as the Divine Logos and Son of God, bringing the soul thereby through Him into direct contact and communion with the living God. Genuinely Christian mysticism is a result of the soul's contact with Jesus Christ rather than the interpretation of the inner life of Jesus, though the mystic temper is assuredly characteristic of "this lowly servant of human souls."

The mystic consciousness is at home within the Church of Christ, though it has many expressions in other religions. It makes its appearance in pre-Christian times; it becomes qualified and enriched by the intuitions of the Master of the Spiritual Life, Jesus Christ; finally, it "takes up" into its very heart and life, through the Christian centuries, Him whom men hailed as "*the Way, the Truth, and the Life.*" St Paul was the great initiator in this new

[1] Page 127.

phase of the advance of Christian Mysticism. His work was brought to classic expression in the Gospel which is so significantly known through history as the Gospel of St John, if we think of St John as the disciple who "lay on Jesus' bosom." The later Christian mystics have been scholars in the school of St Paul and St John. They have listened to other masters and studied in many philosophic schools. They have felt the winds of the spirit blowing from the East, and known them to be the breath of the Spirit of God. But through all these adventures and experiments in the spiritual quest for God, they have retained the Central Vision and Presence which fired the souls of St Paul and St John, and found that in that Vision and Presence they have apprehended the true God, the Very God, the Lord of Life and Truth and Holiness.

INDEX.

Abnormal, in psychology, 76, 94, 126.
Absolute, the, 4, 6, 38, 40.
ἄρρητον, 66, 67 n., 77.
Augustine, St, 13-16, 18 ("summus aspectus"), 18 n., 19, 56, 69, 122, 128.
'Confessions,' 13-14, 19-20, 122.
Auto-suggestion, 51-52.

Bergson, 17.
on Intuition, 17-18.
Bernard, St, 69.
Bradley, F. H., 5 n., 6, 7, 8, 11, 68.
Butler, Dom, 18, 67 n., 68, 94.

Caird, John, 86-87, 128.
Calvin, John, 128.
Cambridge Platonists, the, 9.
John Smith, 92.
Cassian, 94.
Choisy, Professor E., 128.
Christianity, 60, 85, 127.
Chrysostom, St, 70.
Church, the Scottish, 124.
Cooper, Professor James, 91 n.
Cosmological argument, 3-4, 57.

Delacroix, 23, 46.

Eckhardt, 68.

Faith, 104-106, 111-113.
Flournoy, Theodore, 37-38.
Forsyth, P. T., Dr, 43.
Fouillée, M., 35.
Fourth Gospel, 20, 40, 65, 68, 85, 104-105, 110-116, 122, 131.
Francis, St, of Assisi, 98.
Franck, Sebastian, 123.
Friends of God, 16.

Galloway, Principal George, 61.
Genesis, Book of (quoted), 78-79.
Gnostics, 23.
Gnosticism, 116 f.
Gregory, St, 69.

Hebrews, Epistle to, 48-49.
Hebrew religion, 26.
Hegel, 87, 96, 97, 107-8, 116.
Hegelians, 23.
Herrmann, 43-46, 96.
Hirst, E. W., 58.
Holy Spirit, the, and the mystics, 129.
Von Hügel, 12, 46, 51, 92, 99, 109, 115, 122.
Hume, 47.

Idea of God, 10.
Immanence of God, 70, 75.

Inge, W. R., 8, 36 n., 69, 81, 83, 86, 96, 106, 109, 114, 116, 121.
Incarnation, 121.
Intellectualism in religion, 84-85.
Intuition, absolute, 6.
  Bergson on, 17 ff.
  Meaning of term, 12, 15, 18, 22-23, 56, 64, 107.
  and Reason, 16-18.
  St Augustine on, 19.
  Definition of, 20.
  Immediacy of, 21.
  as "Integration," 21, 57, 88, 112.
  Schleiermacher on, 25.
  as "subjective," 60.
  and Holy Spirit, 60.
  and Reason, 3-27, 126.
  and Theology, 91-94.

James, William, 8-9, 33, 63, 64, 66, 76, 127.
Jesus in Christian theology, 44, 112, 130.
John, St, of the Cross, 126, 127.
Jones, Rufus, Professor, 16, 23, 62, 97, 103, 123, 129.
Judaism, 116.

Kant, 24, 35, 83, 96, 116.

Leuba, Professor J. H., 36, 37-43, 46, 53-55, 58, 77.
Locke, John, 57-58.
"Love of God," 14-15.
Loyola, Ignatius, 127.
Luther, Martin, 82, 96-97, 98.

Metaphysics, 10, 41.
Mysticism and history, 112-115.
  Protestantism, 97-100.
  and Roman Catholic piety, 96-98.
Mysticism, 8, 23, 63, 69, 83-4, 96, 109, 121, 125, 136.
  Christian, 109 ff, 116.
Mystics, the, 20, 21, 25.
  of the West, 67-8.
  and Holy Spirit, 125, 129.
Mystical experience, "Noetic Quality" in, 63.
  and Ineffability, 65.
  "Fundus Animæ," 83.
  not peculiar to Christianity, 109.

Neo-Hegelian School, 8.
Neo-Platonism, 19, 20, 122.
Newman, J. H., 64.
Non-Rational in Religion, 81-83.
"Numinous," the, 78, 83-4.

Otto, Professor R., the numinous, 33; 67 n., 69 n., 70-1, 75, 76-84, 89-91, 95, 103 n., 106.

Pascal, 21-23, 26, 64.
Paul, St, 63, 68, 82, 85, 98-99, 110, 112, 119-120, 124, 129, 130-131.
Philosophy and religion, 22, 24-25, 41-2.
Plato, 96.
Plotinus, 12, 19.
Pratt, Professor J. B., 14-15, 45, 94.
Pringle-Pattison, Professor, 6, 35, 47 n., 107, 117-120.
Protestantism, 94, 100.
Pseudo-Dionysius, 67 (quoted), 68-9.
Pseudo-Intuitions, 87.
Psychology and religious experience, 31 ff.
  abnormal in, 76.

Quakerism, 62, 123.

Rashdall, Dr Hastings, 57-58.
Rationalism, 84.
Reality, ultimate, 9, 10, 19.
Reid, Professor H. M. B., 125, 129, 130.
Religion and philosophy, 107-8.
Religious experience and the "Trans-subjective," 32 ff.
  and objective truth, 35-36, 39, 48.

Ribot, 38.
Ritschl, 42.
Ritschlian School, 42-44, 96-97.
Robertson, F. W., 4.
Robinson, Professor Wheeler, 100 n.
Royce, Josiah, 4, 127.

Sacraments, the, 123-127.
Schleiermacher, 24-25, 79.
" Scientia Intuitiva," 7, 17.
Scougal, Henry, 91.
Spinoza, 7, 17, 24, 68.
Stewart, J. A., 106-7.
Streeter, Canon B. H., 83.
" Supernatural " as causal factor in psychology, 47-49.
Suso, Henri, 68.
Symons, Arthur, 126.

Tauler, 15-17, 68.
Tersteegen, 70.
" The Holy " in Ethics and Religion, 77.
" Theologia Germanica," 80 n., 97, 100 n.
Theology, rational, 3.
as Scientia Scientiarum, 5.
Transcendence of God, 67, 69-70.
Immanence of God, 69.
Theology, Christian, 9-10, 40-45.
Thouless, R. H., 59, 62.
Tyrrell, 9, 113.

Validity in religious experience, 59-61.
Via mystica, 89.
Via negativa, 20, 67-8.

Watt, H. J., 31, 32, 34, 47-48, 49 n., 52 n., 54 n.
Watt, T. M., 41 n., 42.
Webb, Professor C. C. J., 55, 57, 65-66.
Wesley, John, 98.
Whitehead, Professor A. N., 27 n.

Printed in Great Britain by
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS LTD.

248.7
W34

Watt, T.M.

The intuition of God

248.7
W34